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UNCONSCIONABILITY IN THE LAW OF TRUSTS
David Horton*
This Article claims that trust law should recognize the unconscionability
defense. It begins by noting the symmetry between trust and contract defenses
and the growing consensus among courts and scholars that trusts are contracts.
It sketches the leading rationales for why courts enforce promises between private
actors: the theories that free exchange allows parties to maximize welfare and
exercise free will. It then argues that neither concept justifies upholding a con-
tractual term if informational defects prevent one party from observing that it
sharply deviates from her ex ante desires. It asserts that the unconscionability
doctrine strikes down contractual terms that suffer from precisely that defect.
The Article then explains how the unconscionability doctrine could serve
the same purpose in trust law. It discusses why the policies underlying freedom
of testation depart from those behind freedom of contract and provide less sup-
port for a laissez faire regime. It then challenges the unarticulated but intuitive
notion that controls in the trust-creation process are sufficient to align an
instrument's text with a settlor's intent. It reveals that corporate fiduciaries,
trust mills, and a revitalized do-it-yourself movement have spawned "procedur-
ally suspect" trusts: those created without attorney involvement and laden with
complex terms. It then examines three common but controversial "substantively
suspect" terms-exculpatory, no contest, and arbitration clauses-and shows
how a trust-specific unconscionability doctrine would improve outcomes in
cases.
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INTRODUCTION
Even with the recent economic downturn, Americans will
bequeath hundreds of billions of dollars a year for the next half-cen-
tury-the largest wealth transfer in history.1 As critics continue to
condemn probate as slow, 2 expensive, 3 and "quite public,"4 trusts are
now a staple of most estate plans. Yet after years of relative stasis, the
1 See John J. Havens & Paul G. Schervish, Why the $41 Trillion Wealth Transfer
Estimate Is Still Valid: A Review of Challenges and Comments, J. GiFT PLAN., Jan. 2003, at
11, 11 (estimating that even with "recessionary growth [and a] depressed stock mar-
ket," beneficiaries will inherit $41 trillion between 1998 and 2052); John Leland,
Breaking the Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008, at HI ("[T]he largest intergenerational
transfer of wealth in American history [is] now under way .. "). Ironically, by reduc-
ing philanthropy, the economic crisis may actually increase the amount of money
inherited by individuals. See Deborah L. Jacobs, As the Economy Declines, Donors Rethink
Estate Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2008, at F27.
2 For the seminal article on the decline of probate as the primary mechanism for
intergenerational transfers, see John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the
Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984). For recent criticism of
the languorous probate process, see Jane Gordon, Judges and Lawyers Debate Probate
System, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, § 14, at 4 (reporting that probate judges in Connecti-
cut were "working so little that they [were] sometimes hard to find"); David Reyes, An
Old Hassle Over This Old House, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2005, at B4 (describing an estate
that has been mired in probate since 1925);John Waggoner, Living Trust Can Get That
Moose Head to Heirs Faster, USA TODAY, Feb. 9, 2007, at 3B ("[A)n executor must take
an inventory of the estate's assets, settle any debts, [and] file a tax return .... ").
3 See, e.g., Chip Jacobs, Inherit a Home-Not a Hassle, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007, at
KI (noting that a $1 million estate will cost $44,000 to probate in California).
4 Kathy M. Kristof, Estate Planning Can Help You Rest Easier, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28,
2007, at CI; see also Frances H. Foster, Privacy and the Elusive Quest for Uniformity in the
Law of Trusts, 38 Apiz. ST. L.J. 713, 766 (2006) [hereinafter Foster, Elusive Quest]
(arguing that reforms meant to unify probate and nonprobate transfers have in fact
widened the gulf with respect to privacy); Frances H. Foster, Trust Privacy, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 555, 575-76, 614 (2008) [hereinafter Foster, Privacy] (noting that "tabloid
reporters, thieves, litigious family members, and spendthrifts" enjoy easy access to pro-
bate files).
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law of trusts is suddenly in flux. In 2006, the United States Supreme
Court opened federal courts to a broad spectrum of trust litigation. 5
The recently published Restatement (Third) of Trusts and Uniform Trust
Code-ambitious projects that have reshaped doctrine more than
merely summarized it6-have ushered in "a moment in time when our
ideas about what a trust is, what it is for, and how to operate it are
under consideration and, indeed, are changing meaningfully. ' 7
One defining characteristic of this reassessment has been trust
law's absorption of principles from contract law. In the last decade,
scholars and courts have begun conceptualizing the trust as a "deal": a
private agreement between the settlor and the trustee to manage the
corpus.8 To be sure, trust law and contract law do not overlap com-
5 For decades, federal judges puzzled over the so-called "probate exception" to
federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Peter Nicolas, Fighting the Probate Mafia: A Dissection of the
Probate Exception to Federal Court Jurisdiction, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 1479, 1482 (2001).
Thus, in Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006), the United States Supreme Court
clarified that the "probate exception" only forbids federal courts from hearing issues
(1) related to the probate, annulment, or administration of a will or (2) in which a
state court has already assumed in rem jurisdiction. See id. at 311-12.
6 SeeJohn H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 Nw. U. L. REv.
1105, 1106 (2004) (calling the Uniform Trust Code and the third Restatement "law
revision projects").
7 Joel C. Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust at the New Millennium,
or, We Don't Have to Think of England Anymore, 62 ALB. L. REv. 543, 543-44 (1998); see
also Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American Trust
Law at Century's End, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1877, 1881 (2000) ("In the last third of this
century, and particularly in the last decade, trust law in the United States has exper-
ienced a period of rigorous, comprehensive reexamination.").
8 SeeJohn H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J.
625, 627 (1995). Reviving the old debate about whether to classify trust as a species of
contract or property doctrine, Langbein concludes that trust is a "prevailingly con-
tractarian institution." Id. at 628. Langbein contends that the shift from land to
financial assets as the primary repository of inherited wealth precipitated the rise of
corporate trustees as skilled portfolio administrators. See id. at 637-43. Accordingly,
although Langbein acknowledges that a trust begins with the transfer of property, he
views its essence as "the trust deal that defines the powers and responsibilities of the
trustee in managing the property." Id. at 627. Likewise, Robert H. Sitkoff concludes
that "[t]he settlor-trustee relationship is indeed contractual, as settlors and trustees
are free to dicker over the terms of the trust. . . even if in fact they do not." Robert H.
Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 621, 643-44 (2004).
Even Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei, who assert that trust law exists to subserve
creditors' rights to beneficiaries' rights-a "property-like aspect"-have no quarrel
with the proposition that "'[t] rusts are contracts.'" Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei,
The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv.
434, 469-72 (1998) (quoting Langbein, supra, at 627).
Likewise, courts are increasingly referring to trusts and contracts interchange-
ably. SeeWilliams v. Interpublic Severance Pay Plan, 523 F.3d 819, 821 (7th Cir. 2008)
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pletely. For example, remedies for breach of trust differ from those
for breach of contract.9 Nevertheless, the analogy between trust and
contract yields three important points. First, like contract law, trust
law consists primarily of default rulesl°-rough estimates of how most
parties would choose to resolve a given contingency." . Because
default rules are guesses about the parties' wishes, the parties can
freely modify them. 12 Second, as in contract law, not all trust law is
("Trust law honors rather than overrides express contractual language specifying a
trustee's powers vis-a-vis a beneficiary."); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.' Health & Wel-
fare Plan v. Wells, 213 F.3d 398, 402 (7th Cir. 2000) (calling an ERISA plan a "con-
tract"); Herdrich v. Pegram, 170 F.3d 683, 686 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[E]ven a full-fledged
trustee need not (indeed, must not) depart from the contractual provisions that the
settlor established."), rev'd, 530 U.S. 211 (2000); Gilbert v. Atl. Trust Co., No. 04-CV-
327-PB, 2006 WL 1049707, at *4 n.6 (D.N.H., Apr. 19, 2006) ("I assume for the pur-
pose of analysis that the revocable trust agreement is in fact a contract."); In re Vebe-
liunas, 252 B.R. 878, 887 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("It follows that a trust, being a
relationship, cannot have an alter ego, which would be akin to saying that someone is
the 'alter ego' of a contract.").
9 For example, under the doctrine of equitable tracing, beneficiaries can assert a
lien on misappropriated trust property. See Sitkoff, supra note 8, at 672. An aggrieved
party to a contract has no such right. See id.
10 See, e.g., T.P. Gallanis, The Trustee's Duty to Inform, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1595, 1604
(2007) ("Many rules of trust law are default rules .... "); Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules
in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1031, 1032
(2004) ("[T]he bulk of [inheritance doctrines] . . . comprise default rules.");
Langbein, supra note 8, at 636 ("[V]irtually all trust law is default law .. "); Max M.
Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent Trust Investment Laws Change
Trust Portfolio Allocation?, 50J.L. & ECON. 681, 687 (2007) (calling trust law's prudent
investor rule "nominally a default rule"); Sitkoff, supra note 8, at 638 ("The trust's
internal relationships are contractarian . . . because the law supplies default
terms .... ").
11 See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 608, 611 (1998) ("[D]efault rules can best approximate the parties'
desires by maximizing their joint wealth or utility."). Default rules spare the parties
the transaction costs of addressing every possible contingency in a contract. See ROB-
ERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICs 220 (5th ed. 2008) ("[Contract
law] minimize[s] transaction costs of negotiating contracts by supplying efficient
default terms . . . ."); RicHaRD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 96 (7th ed.
2007) ("It may be cheaper... for the court to 'draft' the contractual term necessary
to deal with the contingency if and when [it] materializes."). But see Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules,
99 YALE L.J. 87, 89-91 (1989) (arguing that a few "penalty default rules" reflect what
the parties do not want in order to force them to contract around the rules and thus
disclose valuable information).
12 The most controversial aspect of the theory of default trust rules concerns
whether fiduciary duties are waivable default rules. For instance, some scholars
believe that fiduciary duties in corporate law should be modifiable because share
price will indicate when a charter contains a term that invites fiduciary opportunism.
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default. A select cluster of trust rules-for example, the requisites of
trust formation, or the necessity that trustees owe enforceable
duties-cannot be overridden. These immutable rules are too vital to
the institution of trust to be displaced. 13 Third, trust instruments,
exactly like contracts, will be economically efficient. Because a trust is
a "voluntary transaction between competent adults, ... [it] carries a
presumption of Pareto optimality."'1 4 Thus, unless fraud or coercion
taints the drafting or execution of the trust, and subject to the proviso
that the parties cannot displace immutable rules, courts should not
regulate this aspect of private ordering.
Nevertheless, despite this shared foundation, trust and contract
diverge in a notable way. Contract law recognizes the defense of
unconscionability: a potent exception to the tenet that courts should
permit unfettered exchange. Unconscionability, which applies most
often to standard form contracts, 15 lets courts void clauses that are
both procedurally unconscionable (nonnegotiable and buried in fine
print) 16  and substantively unconscionable (grossly unfair) .17
Although the rule has a centuries-old pedigree,' 8 it has also long been
criticized. Scholars decry the amorphousness of using "fairness" as a
See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the
Anti-Cbntractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 18-50 (1990). However, there is no similar
market signal in trust law, and beneficiaries, unlike shareholders, cannot "exit" if they
learn about trustee malfeasance. See Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary
Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEo. L.J. 67, 82-83 (2005).
13 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 428 (Supp. 2008)
(enumerating fourteen "mandatory" rules); Langbein, supra note 6, at 1106 ("Such
terms, were they allowed, would authorize the trustee to loot the trust."). Another
ground for mandatory rules is that they forbid a settlor from making a transfer that,
while ostensibly in trust, is in fact a different form of property, like a fee simple. See
id. at 1124. In turn, strict adherence to the confines of recognized property rights
saves third parties the significant cost and effort of determining "the attributes of
these rights, both to avoid violating them and to acquire them from present holders."
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith,
Numerus Clausus]; see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract
Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 773, 844 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Property!
Contract Interface] (discussing trusts and information costs).
14 Sitkoff, supra note 8, at 644; see also Langbein, supra note 8, at 652 (contending
that the trustee's "reasonable understanding of the deal should be as relevant as the
settlor's" with respect to "aspects of the trust deal that touch the interests, duties, and
responsibilities of the trustee").
15 See infra Part I.B.
16 See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
18 See infra note 41.
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legal criterion 19 and the paternalism of overriding a party's voluntary
choice to sign an agreement.20 Recently, however, behavioral eco-
nomics has provided a new understanding of the doctrine.21 Under
this view, the rule applies where informational defects in the con-
tracting process cause terms to deviate sharply from what one party
would have chosen with better information. The procedural uncon-
scionability prong isolates terms that may suffer from informational
flaws; the substantive unconscionability element employs "unfairness"
as a rough proxy for detecting terms to which the party would not
have agreed had she been aware of them. Clauses that depart from an
informed party's ex ante preferences will neither be efficient nor fos-
ter the party's free will.2 2 By striking down these terms, the unconscio-
nability doctrine serves vital purposes. 23
Trust law has no analogue. Although trust and contract share
defenses such as fraud, duress, mistake, illegality, incapacity, impossi-
bility, and undue influence-not to mention the same intent-seeking
mode of interpretation 24-unconscionability exists only in contract.
In some ways, this is surprising. Trust rules evolved, in part, from pro-
bate, where judges play an active role. 25 One would expect to find a
19 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. &
ECON. 293, 294 (1975) ("The doctrine should not, in my view, allow courts to act as
roving commissions to set aside those agreements whose substantive terms they find
objectionable."); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 559 (1967) (arguing that section 2-302 of the Uniform
Commercial Code illustrates the ease with which one can "say nothing with words").
20 See Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L.
REV. 1053, 1055 (1977) (disputing the claim that "poverty, market unresponsiveness,
and incompetence" provide valid bases for findings of procedural unconscionability);
Horacio Spector, A Contractarian Approach to Unconscionability, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 95,
116 (2006) (claiming that unconscionability "encourage[s] irresponsibility ... and
greater dependency").
21 See infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
22 See infra Part I.C.
23 See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 78 (1993)
("For any theory of contract law based on individual autonomy and consent or Pare-
tian concepts of welfare, the question of what constitutes voluntary consent to a trans-
action is of crucial importance.").
24 Compare 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 600, at 284-85 (3d ed. 1961) (asserting that in contract law, the
intent of the parties is the "polestar or lodestar of interpretation"), with Day v. Ras-
mussen, 629 S.E.2d 912, 915 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) ("'The polestar of trust interpreta-
tion is the settlors' intent.'" (quoting L'Argent v. Barnett Bank, 730 So. 2d 395, 397
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999))).
25 See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 2, at 1117 (noting that court supervision in pro-
bate serves the purposes of clearing title, paying off creditors, and effectuating the
decedent's intent).
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doctrine that empowers courts to evaluate a term's "unfairness" within
the same body of law that allows courts to adjust a trustee's compensa-
tion if it "is unreasonably low or high."26 Unconscionability, which
restricts transferor autonomy, would also seem more at home within
the narrow confines of trust than the free-for-all that is contract. Trust
law, unlike contract law, limits dead hand control through the rule
against perpetuities. 27 Trusts, unlike contracts, cannot be "capri-
cious"; thus, a settlor cannot require the trustee to annihilate valuable
property or construct a wistful statue28-objectives that the settlor
could accomplish through contract law during life. 29 But even
though trust law defers less often to transferors' wishes, it is agnostic
about procedural and substantive "fairness."
On the other hand, we do not think of trusts as being susceptible
to procedural or substantive defects. An attorney meets the settlor,
memorializes her wishes, and revises the instrument if necessary.
These circumstances-a far cry from take-it-or-leave-it standard form
contracting-seem to foreclose settlor complaints about the execu-
tion process or the instrument's language. As the Illinois Supreme
Court noted while rejecting an elderly widow's claim that her trust's
irrevocability clause should be invalid because her attorney never dis-
cussed it with her, " [i]f such a contention had merit very few modern
legal instruments could withstand attacks."30 Likewise, because bene-
ficiaries receive the windfall of an inheritance, they also seem to lack
the right to object to procedural or substantive unfairness in the
accompanying trust instrument. Perhaps for these reasons, no judge
or scholar of whom I am aware has ever suggested that trust law
embrace the unconscionability doctrine.
In this Article, however, I make exactly that claim. More and
more, trusts are being created by unrepresented settlors who seldom
grasp the instrument's nuances. This sea change is a product of three
factors. First, institutional trustees dominate the market for medium
and larger estates. These corporations sometimes condition their will-
ingness to act as a fiduciary on the settlor acquiescing to their stan-
26 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(7) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 428 (Supp.
2008) (prohibiting the parties from contracting around this rule).
27 See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch & William KS. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead
Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 4 (1992) (arguing that lawmakers "should consider not only for
how long but also in what ways a testator proposes to control property after her
death").
28 Langbein, supra note 6, at 1108. This follows from the rule that "a trust and its
terms [must] be for the benefit of its beneficiaries." UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b) (3).
29 See infra notes 131-43 and accompanying text.
30 Pernod v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 132 N.E.2d 540, 543 (Il1. 1956).
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dard trust instrument 3 1-a practice that is indistinguishable from
adhesive contracting. Second, on the other side of the spectrum, mil-
lions of blue-collar and middle-class Americans have turned to "trust
mills": companies run by nonlawyers who create low quality boiler-
plate instruments.3 2 Third, next-generation do-it-yourself books and
software have fueled a recent "boom in homegrown estate plan-
ning."33 Accordingly, a more diverse cross-section of society is using
trusts, "including esoteric trusts, ''34 but "increasingly without aid of
legal counsel."35
The contents of trusts are changing, too. The cost of working
with an institutional fiduciary is often a broad exculpatory clause3 6 or
authorization for the trustee to use the trust's corpus to defend itself
in litigation.37 As the New York Surrogate's Court recently put it, the
result has been instruments that give corporate trustees "almost
unlimited powers with a minimum of obligations."3 8 Similarly, mill
trusts resemble standard form contracts more than testamentary
instruments. To try to seem as sophisticated as lawyer-drafted docu-
ments, mill trusts can be up to one hundred pages long and include
sweeping no-contest clauses and arbitration clauses.39 Settlors almost
certainly have no inkling that these provisions exist-let alone that
they seriously erode beneficiaries' rights. Thus, informational defects
31 See Melanie B. Leslie, Common Law, Common Sense: Fiduciary Standards and Trus-
tee Identity, 27 CARDozo L. REv. 2713, 2715 (2006) (describing settlors who "work with
an investment advisor that sets up the trust (with a document drafted by its legal
department), explains the document, and then acts as trustee"). For cases involving
claimed abuses by institutional trustees that also drafted the instrument, see Americans
for the Arts v. Ruth Lilly Charitable Remainder Annuity Trust, 855 N.E.2d 592, 595 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2006); McGinley v. Bank of America, 109 P.3d 1146, 1156 (Kan. 2005); Rutanen
v. Ballard, 678 N.E.2d 133, 140-41 (Mass. 1997); Petty v. Privette, 818 S.W.2d 743, 748
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
32 See Paul Premack, 'Trust Mill' Representatives Not Licensed to Provide Legal Advice,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 27, 2005, at 9C.
33 Christine Larson, A Need for a Will? Often, There's an Online Way, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 14, 2007, at BU3.
34 Dobris, supra note 7, at 563,
35 Halbach, supra note 7, at 1883.
36 See infra notes 241-47 and accompanying text.
37 See, e.g., Ronald Chester & Sarah Reid Ziomek, Removal of Corporate Trustees
Under the Uniform Trust Code and Other Current Law: Does a Contractual Lense Help Clarify
the Rights of Beneficiaries, 67 Mo. L. REv. 241, 242 (2002) (describing a bank that was
able to use trust funds to oppose an elderly widow's petition to remove it as trustee).
38 In re Estate of Stralem, 695 N.Y.S.2d 274, 278 (Sur. Ct. 1999) (calling this ten-
dency "a serious potential menace not only to the rights of a surviving spouse but of
the children and other dependents of the testator and of all persons interested in
estates").
39 See infra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
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belie the proposition that all trusts are necessarily optimal and intent
effectuating.
A trust-specific unconscionability doctrine could ameliorate these
flaws. In the trust context, the driving force behind the procedural
unconscionability element would be to isolate clauses that the settlor
was unlikely to comprehend. Courts could examine whether the set-
tlor was represented by counsel and the relative complexity of the
clause at issue. As with standard form contracts, the substantive
unconscionability prong would hinge on the harshness of a term.
Because the purpose of a trust instrument is to benefit the benefi-
ciaries, unfair terms are unlikely to reflect a fully informed settlor's
preferences. In addition, unfair terms may create negative externali-
ties: beneficiaries would probably be willing to pay the settlor an
amount to eliminate the term that exceeds its value to the settlor.40
The unconscionability doctrine would provide courts with the means
to police trusts for language that exhibits these shortcomings.
Part I describes the underpinnings of the unconscionability doc-
trine in contract law. It begins by sketching the normative core of
freedom of contract: the efficiency and autonomy theories. It shows
that neither paradigm justifies enforcing a clause in an agreement if
one party lacks at least a general sense of what the clause accom-
plishes. Part I then contends that the unconscionability doctrine
invalidates terms that suffer from precisely that defect.
Part II claims that the unconscionability doctrine could serve the
same purpose in trust law. It discusses why the policies behind free-
dom of testation depart from those behind freedom of contract and
provide less support for a laissez faire regime. Part II then questions
the unarticulated but intuitive notion that controls:in the trust-crea-
tion process are sufficient to align an instrument's text with a settlor's
intent. It reveals that corporate fiduciaries, trust mills, and the self-
help movement have spawned what I deem the "procedurally suspect"
trust: one created without attorney involvement and laden with com-
plex terms. Part II then defines substantive unconscionability in the
trust context.
Part III examines three common but controversial terms-those
that enlarge the trustee's powers, condition gifts on beneficiaries not
contesting the trust, and require arbitration-and shows how the
unconscionability doctrine would improve outcomes in cases.
40 See Adam J. Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 33, 70 (1999) ("Because no one can bargain with a decedent to revise a socially
harmful estate plan, it would remain in effect even where the cost to others (and the
sums they would be willing to pay to avoid it) exceeded its value to her .... ").
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I. UNCONSCIONABILITY IN CONTRACT LAW
Debates over the limits of freedom of contract began centuries
ago,4I and unconscionability remains among the most divisive issues
in private law. This Part uses insights from behavioral economics to
offer qualified support for the modern unconscionability defense. It
first explains how the dominant rationales for freedom of contract-
the efficiency and autonomy theories-cannot justify enforcing terms
that do not reflect buyers' ex ante preferences. It then argues that the
unconscionability defense is best understood as a means of identifying
and striking those terms. By elucidating that unconscionability serves
important values, I hope to lay the groundwork for my normative
claim that it could do the same in trust doctrine.
A. Rationales for Freedom of Contract
Scholars often justify the government's practice of enforcing
promises between private actors on either utilitarian or liberal-individ-
ualistic grounds. 42 The most famous utilitarian theory, law and eco-
nomics, contends that contract doctrine binds parties to facilitate
"mutually beneficial economic exchange. '4 3 As is well known, the
41 For example, the Roman principle of laesio enormis allowed the seller of land to
rescind the agreement if she received less than half of its "true value." REINHARD
ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 259-62 (1990). See also Harry G. Prince,
Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint and Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459,
467 (1995) (noting that laesio enormis, with its exclusive focus on unfair price, was
much more restrained than the contemporary unconscionability doctrine). Similarly,
the English Chancery courts denounced "unconscientious bargains." See Earl of Ches-
terfield v. Janssen, (1750) 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch.); see also ROBERT A. HILLMAN,
THE RICHNESS OF CoTrrRAcr LAW 129 (1997) ("The American unconscionability stan-
dard can be traced to the Chancery court of England."). Colonial American courts
also routinely voided deals for inadequate consideration. See MORTON J. HORWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 164 (1977). For as long, how-
ever, these practices have been controversial. As Lord Bramwell put it, the sheer fact
that two people entered into a contract "is the strongest possible proof that it is a
reasonable agreement." Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire Ry. Co. v. Brown,
[1883] App. Cas. 703, 718 (H.L.).
42 See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CoTRAcr THEORY 46 (2004) ("Most contract theories
can be placed into one of two broad categories.. . : utilitarian theories or rights-based
theories."); David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Inter-
pretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1823-24 (1991) (discussing autonomy, reciprocity,
and instrumentalism as grounds on which "lawyers generally understand contracts to
be enforceable").
43 LARRY A. DIMATrEo ET AL., VISIONS OF CoNTRACr THEORY 16 (2007); see also
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 11, at 243 ("By enforcing promises, contract law enables
people to make credible commitments to cooperate with each other.... [And] con-
tract law creates incentives for efficient cooperation.").
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lynchpin of economic analysis of law is rational choice theory: the
assumption that individuals seek to maximize their self-interest. 44
Since rational choice theory suggests that individuals will agree to
deals that make them better off and refuse those that make them
worse off, it establishes a compelling case for upholding contracts as
written. Doing so will increase the welfare of both contracting parties
and thus all of society.45
Liberal-individualistic theories revolve around the value of auton-
omy. They view contract law as a vehicle by which individuals acquire
and transfer rights and entitlements and thus experience freedom
and self-determination. 46 Because contract law holds people to their
word, it "makes available options that would otherwise be unavaila-
ble."'4 7 But the role of the state stops there.48 Not only are the parties
the best judges of what they stand to gain or lose from a transaction,
44 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 11, at 16 ("[C]onsumers maximize utility (i.e.,
happiness or satisfaction), firms maximize profits, politicians maximize votes, bureau-
cracies maximize revenues, charities maximize social welfare. ); POSNER, supra
note 11, at 3 ("The task of economics ... is to explore the implications of assuming
that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions-what we shall
call his 'self interest.'" (footnote omitted)); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen,
Law and Behavorial Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics,
88 CAL. L. REv. 1051, 1060-66 (2000) (cataloguing four subtly different definitions of
rational choice theory).
45 See DIMATrEO ET AL., supra note 43, at 18 ("[E]conomics argues that freedom
of contract should almost always be honored because private bargaining by rational
people should, in light of the Coase Theorem, maximize wealth."); SMITH, supra note
42, at 110 ("Arguably the most fundamental idea underlying efficiency theories of
contract law is that if two persons make a voluntary exchange the exchange will make
each better off, and is therefore efficient.").
46 See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 13 (1981) ("In order that I be as free
as possible, that my will have the greatest possible range consistent with the similar
will of others, it is necessary that there be a way in which I may commit myself.");
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAw 206,
223 (Peter Benson ed., 2001) ("Autonomy theories of contract are based on the con-
cept that allowing an individual to freely own and dispose of property and freely exer-
cise his will to make choices concerning his person, labor, and property, is a value that
is paramount .... ").
47 SMITH, supra note 42, at 140; see also Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default
Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REv. 489, 514 (1989) ("If promises
were not binding, it is argued, individual freedom would be unjustifiably restricted, as
individuals would be deprived of the freedom to place themselves under a moral obli-
gation respecting their future conduct.").
48 See Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementa-
tion, 97 COLUM. L. Rev. 1710, 1769 (1997) ("Society should respect the autonomy of
every individual and refrain from dictating any conception of 'the good life."').
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but second-guessing their decisions would be inimical to free will-
the very attribute that the edifice of contract exists to serve. 49
Of course, both efficiency- and autonomy-based theories recog-
nize that the government should not blindly uphold all ostensibly
valid agreements. For example, if a corporation threatens to file a
bogus lawsuit against a struggling homeowner unless she deeds her
house for less than market price, a judge will nullify the conveyance
on the grounds of duress.50 By leaving the homeowner no reasonable
alternative, the corporation has artificially constricted her range of
rational and free choices. 51 Likewise, if the homeowner signs a docu-
ment justifiably believing a firm's representation that it is a loan to
avoid foreclosure-when in fact it is a deed to the property-fraud
will vitiate the transfer.52 Enforcing the contract will neither maxi-
mize the homeowner's welfare (she based her cost-benefit analysis on
phantom terms) nor foster her free will (she meant to do something
else).
Courts will also annul some contracts that are perfectly consistent
with efficiency and autonomy principles. The homeowner could not
sell her child5 3 or take a second mortgage with an exorbitant interest
rate54-no matter how informed and deliberate her reasoning. The
defenses of illegality and violation of public policy forbid certain
forms of commodification 55 or transactions that have socially deleteri-
49 See SMITH, supra note 42, at 113 ("[T] he basic rule that contract law should give
effect to the intentions of the parties is explained on the basis of the assumption that
contracting parties typically know best what is in their own interests.").
50 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmt. b (1981).
51 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 11, at 282-83 (noting that improper threats
merely redistribute from one party to another, while bargained-for exchanges create a
surplus); TREBILCOCK, supra note 23, at 79 ("Threats reduce the possibilities open to
the recipient of the proposal, whereas offers expand them.").
52 See Eicher v. Mid Am. Fin. Inv. Corp., 702 N.W.2d 792, 800, 804 (Neb. 2005).
53 "Although only about half the states have laws specifically aimed at the black
market in babies for adoption, a free market in babies would run afoul of restrictions
on adoptions in every state." Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adop-
tions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59, 62 n.7 (1987) (citation omitted).
54 See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight
of Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1111
(2008) ("Throughout the history of the American Republic, all but a small minority of
states have capped interest rates on loans to consumers with usury law.").
55 See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1849, 1925
(1987) ("If we permit babies to be sold, we commodify not only the mother's (and
father's) baby-making capacities-which might be analogous to commodifying sexual-
ity-but we also conceive of the baby itself in market rhetoric."); see also TREBILCOCK,
supra note 23, at 29-57 (analyzing the alienability of babies, sexual services, and body
parts from an instrumentalist perspective).
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ous effects. 56 These rules safeguard values that lawmakers deem to
trump the gains from free exchange.
Thus, contract defenses fall into two categories. 57  Some, like
fraud and duress, arise from defects in the contracting process.5 8
Others, like illegality and violation of public policy, stem from
problems with the agreement's substance.59 This taxonomic rigidity
prevents them from being useful in the context of the most common
species of contract: the standard form.
B. Standard Form Contracts
Virtually all modern contracts are standard forms. 60 These "con-
tracts of adhesion"61 pose special problems for the efficiency and
autonomy theories. They have the rudiments of contract formation:
consideration and a signature (or a click of the mouse) that objec-
tively displays a buyer's intent to be bound. But in an echo of the
duress example above, sellers offer standard forms on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis, restricting the range of consumers' meaningful choices.
56 See Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconsciona-
bility Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 283, 286-87 (1995) (defending usury statutes on the ground that they counter-
act the fact that the safety-net function of the welfare regime encourages high-isk
borrowing).
57 See Leff, supra note 19, at 487.
58 See id.
59 See id.
60 See, e.g., A. CORIN, CoBlIN ON CONTRACTS § 559A (Supp. 1989) ("[T]he bulk
of contracts signed in this country, if not every major Western nation, are adhesion
contracts ...."); David Horton, Hipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard
Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 3), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractis=1154243 ("Standard forms have
all but subsumed the practice of contracting."); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality,
Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1203 (2003)
("[N]early all commercial and consumer sales contracts are form driven."); W. David
Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L.
REv. 529, 529 (1971) ("[S]tandard form contracts probably account for more than
ninety-nine percent of all contracts now made.").
61 This phrase, coined by French jurist Raymond Saleilles, was appropriated by
Edwin Patterson. See Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33
HARv. L. REv. 198, 222 (1919); Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction
of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 833, 856 (1964) (describing a contract "in which a
single will is exclusively predominant, acting as a unilateral will which dictates its law,
no longer to an individual, but to an indeterminate collectivity" (quoting and translat-
ing RAYMoND SALEIILES, DE tA DtClARATION tE VOLoN'Ir § 89, at 229-30 (1901))).
However, it did not enter the lexicon until the 1940s, when Friedrich Kessler pub-
lished Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv.
629 (1943).
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Likewise, just as bad information undermines efficiency and auton-
omy values in the fraud context, most buyers sign standard forms with-
out reading them.62 Although some courts impose a duty to the
contrary,63 it is not clear whether a rational buyer would spend the
time and energy required to decode boilerplate language in a non-
negotiable agreement. 64 Finally, it is widely believed that the contents
of standard forms are objectionable: capitalizing on buyers' rational
ignorance, sellers lace the fine print with one-sided terms. 65 Thus, at
first blush, it is hard to square standard forms with contract law's ani-
mating policies.
To this predicament, economic analysis supplies two valuable
insights. The first is that competitive markets discipline sellers to draft
terms that reflect consumers' preferences. 66 Every clause in an agree-
ment represents a trade-off between risk and price. To cater to the
elite cadre of consumers who shop for favorable terms, a seller cannot
increase the amount of risk a clause allocates to the consumer without
concomitantly reducing the price of the agreement. 67 If a seller offers
62 See Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard Form
Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 237 (2007)
("The fact that consumers do not read standard form contracts is so well accepted
and documented as to be virtually enshrined as dogma .... ).
63 Compare Gaskin v. Stumm Handel GmbH, 390 F. Supp. 361, 363, 367 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (upholding a forum selection clause even though it was written in German, a
language that plaintiff did not understand), with Drelles v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co., 881
A.2d 822, 836 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) ("[A] non-commercial insured is under no duty
to read the policy as issued and sent by the insurance company.").
64 See Peter A. Alces, Guerilla Terms, 56 EMORY L.J. 1511, 1513, 1525-28 (2007)
("[I]t is irrational to read standard forms like those used in common consumer trans-
actions.... "); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract,
47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 243 (1995) ("[A] rational form taker will typically decide to
remain ignorant of the preprinted terms.").
65 See Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics
Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 605 (1990) ("Intuitively, any profit-maximiz-
ing business would prefer to shift a risk to the other party if it could do so at no
additional cost."); Slawson, supra note 60, at 531 (calling "all standard forms unfair").
66 This subpart relies heavily on Korobkin, supra note 60, at 1208-16, and Russell
Korobkin, A "Traditional" and "Behavorial" Law-and-Economics Analysis of Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 26 U. HAW. L. REv. 441, 448-58 (2004).
67 See George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J.
1297, 1347 (1981) (contending that because firms compete over marginal buyers, "a
small group of consumers" may force firms to draft terms "responsive to the group's
preferences"); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 638 (1979)
("The presence of at least some consumer search in a market creates the possibility of
a 'pecuniary externality': persons who search sometimes protect nonsearchers from
overreaching firms.").
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a self-serving term but fails to compensate by lowering prices, it will
lose customers to firms that either lower prices or do not use the
term. 68 Likewise, if a seller eliminates a favorable clause, it cannot
continue to earn the same revenue unless it charges more. Because
risk and price are thus inversely correlated-one rises as the other
falls-terms that seem unfair to buyers may actually represent their
desired mix of risk and price and thus be efficient. In fact, unless
contract language is novel or idiosyncratic, its very existence is strong
evidence that buyers prefer it to some other combination of attrib-
utes. 69 Indeed, if a superior clause existed, a competitor would adopt
it and siphon off business.
For example, consider the notorious "cross-collateralization"
clause in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.70 that allowed Walker-
Thomas to repossess all the furniture it had sold to Williams if she
missed one installment payment. In its landmark decision, the D.C.
Circuit opined that it would void the clause if it were "unfair."71 At
first, the clause seems to meet this criterion: it imposes a major forfei-
ture for a mere slip. Yet if Walker-Thomas cannot hedge against
default, consumers like Williams may be priced out of the rent-to-own
market. The clause helps Walker-Thomas charge less both by giving it
a way to recover losses and by creating a formidable incentive for con-
sumers to pay on time.72 Buyers must prefer to pay less for furniture
and accept the unforgiving clause; if they did not, another store would
68 See POSNER, supra note 11, at 116 ("[I]f one seller offers unattractive terms,
won't a competing seller, wanting sales for himself, offer more attractive terms... ?");
Korobkin, supra note 60, at 1209-10 ("If one seller ('Firm') were to provide a low-
quality [term] but not reduce its price, no buyers would choose to purchase from
Firm."); Meyerson, supra note 65, at 590-93 (noting that a firm can poach customers
from its rival by charging the same amount for a product accompanied by a contract
that omits a pro-seller clause).
69 See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 439 (2002) ("Uniformity of terms within an
industry, in fact, might indicate that the industry is highly competitive."); Korobkin,
supra note 66, at 449 ("The fact that [a firm] continues to use a... clause is evidence
that customers prefer the combination of term (bad) and price (low) relative to other
economically possible combinations of term and price.").
70 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
71 See id. at 447.
72 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 11, at 117 (explaining that, without these savings, a
business (like Walker-Thomas) will charge higher down payments, higher installment
payments, or raise overall prices); Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, in BOLLER-
PLATE 131, 138 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007) (noting that Williams' "willingness to
give up the furniture in the event of default sends a powerful signal that default is
unlikely").
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have dropped the term, charged more, and put Walker-Thomas out of
business.73
The second economic principle that sheds light on why standard
form contracts are less troubling than they first seem is that sellers will
draft terms that internalize buyers' interests even in the absence of
vigorous competition. A monopolist will exploit its advantage by
charging supra-competitive prices. But it can attract more buyers and
still profit on each component aspect of the deal by offering terms
that buyers value at more than the cost of production.7 4 For instance,
if Walker-Thomas offers a warranty that costs twenty-five dollars to ser-
vice but that consumers value at thirty dollars, it will sell the warranty
for twenty-nine dollars. Walker-Thomas will continue to do so even if
it becomes the only furniture store in existence. The warranty
increases the utility both of Walker-Thomas (by four dollars) and buy-
ers (by one dollar). Eliminating the term will only deprive Walker-
Thomas of four dollars in profit and drive away marginal consumers
who would have made the purchase for an extra one dollar of utility.
75
Thus, even a monopolist should offer efficient terms.
Together these two points have powerful policy implications.
From an efficiency perspective, the fact that sellers in all circum-
stances will offer terms that increase buyers' welfare elucidates why
standard form contracts are valid. More than that, it mandates that
(in the absence of a traditional defense) courts uphold a standard
form as written, no matter how "unfair" it seems. If a court invalidates
a term, it makes both sellers and buyers worse off. For example, if
Walker-Thomas must excise the cross-collateralization term, it will
73 See Korobkin, supra note 66, at 448-49.
74 See DIMATrEO ET AL., supra note 43, at 28 ("[M] onopolists can maximize profits
in most cases by offering efficient terms and charging monopolistic prices rather than
by offering inefficient anti-buyer terms and correspondingly lower prices."); R. Ted
Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to
Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HAsTINcs L.J. 635, 638 (1996) ("[A] rational monop-
olist would simply extract monopoly profits directly through price."); Korobkin, supra
note 60, at 1212 ("By first providing efficient terms and then raising price above its
competitive-market level, sellers can maximize total profits." (emphasis omitted));
Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?,
112 YALE L.J. 829, 843 (2003) ("Even if the seller or creditor has market power, it has
the right incentive to supply the terms that parties desire."); Priest, supra note 67, at
1321 ("[M]onopoly profits are maximized by selling a product identical in all respects
(except price) to the product offered under competition."); Schwartz, supra note 20,
at 1072 (noting that a monopolist would be irrational not to provide terms for which
consumers are willing to pay a premium).
75 See Korobkin, supra note 60, at 1211-12 ("Even when the seller is a monopolist,
buyers have the option of not purchasing the goods or services in question.").
[VOL. 84:4I 69 o
UNCONSCIONABILITY IN THE LAW OF TRUSTS
raise prices. Marginal buyers will no longer buy furniture and enjoy
greater utility. Even consumers who still make the purchase will be
denied their ideal mix of risk and price and thus capture less of the
contractual surplus.7 6
The implications for the autonomy theory are more complex.
Because consent must be informed to be valid, the fact that consum-
ers generally ignore standard form terms would seem to make them
unenforceable. Yet scholars in the autonomy camp conceptualize
assent to a standard form as two-tiered: an assent to "the broad
type... of transaction" and a "blanket assent (not a specific assent) to
any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on his
form." 77 As a result, if sellers peppered the boilerplate with exploita-
tive terms, the autonomy theory would uphold only the contractual
shell-basic aspects of the deal like the product itself and its price-
but not the internal fine print. However, as mentioned, economic
analysis dictates that the boilerplate will, in fact, reflect most consum-
ers' preferences. Because these clauses will not be "unreasonable or
indecent," they should be enforceable. To be sure, buyers cannot cus-
tomize the transaction (as they would under a regime where free will
flourished), and it is not entirely consistent with the precepts of
autonomy to bind them to promises they did not voluntarily make.
Nevertheless, if this lack of knowing assent vitiated the fine print,
courts would have to fill the resulting contractual gaps with default
rules: implied-in-law terms to which neither party has knowingly
assented.78 Thus, the conclusion that standard forms will reflect
majoritarian tastes is no small thing. In sum, any attempt to set aside a
form clause must explain why sellers lack incentives to draft the clause
to mirror consumers' predilections.
Recently, behavioral economics has done exactly that. The cen-
terpiece of the tidy account of efficient form terms is the notion that
consumers detect unfavorable clauses and demand price reductions
by defecting to other sellers. Nested within this hypothesis are heroic
assumptions about human cognition. To discipline sellers, buyers
would have to use nonselective and compensatory decisionmaking
76 See Korobkin, supra note 66, at 450.
77 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370 (1960).
78 For an attempt to rectify the notion of autonomous consent with default rules,
see Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA.
L. REv. 821, 827 (1992) ("[E]nforcement may still be justified on the grounds of con-
sent when default rules are chosen to reflect the commonsense or conventional
understanding of most parties."). But see Craswell, supra note 47, at 515 (arguing that
autonomy theories, with their focus on individual freedom, cannot dictate the con-
tent of implied legal rules).
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strategies, both "compar[ing] all attributes of each available product"
and "trad[ing] off the desirable attributes of one product against the
desirable attributes of a competing product. ' 79 Studies have shown
this model to be unrealistic. Consumer choice is driven not by a
painstaking cost-benefit evaluation, but instead by heuristics: "mental
shortcuts and rules of thumb. '8 0 For example, as Nobel Laureate Her-
bert Simon theorized fifteen years ago, consumers rarely even attempt
to acquire and process the full panoply of information that would be
required for optimal decisionmaking. 81 To the contrary, they engage
in "satisficing" and base purchasing choices on the presence, nature,
or quality of specific attributes.82 Under the simplest such decision-
making mechanism, known as the "lexicographic" model, consumers
select the product that scores highest on the single most important
product characteristic.8 3 For instance, a consumer might choose a tel-
evision entirely because of its superlative picture. Amos Tversky
describes a related approach as "elimination by aspects":
In contemplating the purchase of a new car, for example, the
first aspect selected may be automatic transmission: this will elimi-
nate all cars that do not have this feature. Given the remaining
alternatives, another aspect, say a $3000 price limit, is selected and
all cars whose price exceeds this limit are excluded. The process
continues until all cars but one are eliminated. 84
79 Korobkin, supra note 60, at 1220.
80 Christine Jolls et al., A Behavorial Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL
LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 14 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
81 SeeJAMEs G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 162 (2d ed. 1993)
("Most human decision-making... is concerned with the discovery and selection of
satisfactory alternatives; only in exceptional cases is it concerned with the discovery
and selection of optimal alternatives."); 3 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED
RATIONALITY 287 (1997) ("In real-world situations, it is seldom realistic to talk about
examining all alternatives or paying attention to all the potentially relevant informa-
tion."); see also DIMATFEO ET AL., supra note 43, at 29 ("People generally cannot and
will not in any complex contract fully consider all potentially relevant contractual
provisions."); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 69, at 451 ("[P]eople rarely invest in a
complete search for information, nor do they fully process the information they
receive.").
82 See 3 SIMON, supra note 81, at 296 ("Psychology proposes the mechanism of
aspiration levels: if it turns out to be very easy to find alternatives that meet the crite-
ria, the standards are gradually raised; if search continues for a long while without
finding satisfactory alternatives, the standards are gradually lowered.").
83 SeeJOHN W. PAYNE ET AL., THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER 26 (1993) ("The lexi-
cographic procedure determines the most important attribute and then examines the
Values of all alternatives on that attribute. The alternative with the best value on the
most important attribute is selected.").
84 Amos Tversky, Elimination by Aspects: A Theory of Choice, 79 PSYCHOL. REv. 281,
285 (1972).
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Finally, buyers subscribe to the "conjunctive" heuristic and select
the product that "exceeds a minimum acceptable level on all attrib-
utes, without regard to whether it exceeds those thresholds by a small
or large amount. 8
5
Because consumers thus fixate on certain "salient" aspects of the
deal and ignore all others, they cannot compel sellers to draft efficient
boilerplate language. 8 6 Sellers have no incentive to perfect the mix of
risk and price in a contract term if consumers do not factor it into
their purchasing choices.8 7 In fact, the market pushes sellers in the
opposite direction. Obscure provisions such as venue and arbitration
clauses are likely to be nonsalient.8 8 Sellers can therefore make these
clauses one-sided and pass less than an optimal amount of these sav-
ings to buyers.8 9 These terms will be inefficient.
Nonsalient clauses fare no better under the autonomy theory.
Recall that aside from the transaction's core elements, consumers
only offer "blanket assent" to "not unreasonable" clauses.90 To lower
prices by manipulating nonsalient terms, sellers must shift responsibil-
ity for substantial risks to consumers. These terms will thus likely
seem unfair. Because buyers have offered neither knowing nor "blan-
ket" assent to them, they should be unenforceable. 91
Thus, we arrive where we began. Standard forms may be ubiqui-
tous, but neither the efficiency nor the autonomy paradigms can
explain why courts uphold contractual language that consumers likely
85 Korobkin, supra note 60, at 1224. Two related models are the "majority of
confirming dimensions" heuristic (under which consumers pick the product that
"wins" the most attribute comparisons) and the "frequency of good and bad features"
heuristic (under which consumers evaluate products by counting the features that
they deem "good" or "bad"). See PAYNE ET AL., supra note 83, at 27-28.
86 See Korobkin, supra note 60, at 1234-39.
87 See id.
88 See id. at 1243.
89 Id. at 1234.
90 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
91 See Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FoRDH-m L. REv. 627, 638
(2002) (arguing that form terms should be enforceable so long as they "do not
exceed some bound of reasonableness"); Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of
Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MiAMi L. REv. 1263,
1271 (1993) ("[M]erchants and sellers who know that consumers do not read these
terms have no objective basis for claiming that the consumers agreed to those
terms."); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HA\v. L.
REv. 1173, 1251 (1983) (arguing that courts should only enforce "visible" form
terms); W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts
Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. Pirr. L. REv. 21, 23, 30-31 (1984) (urging courts to give
effect to "the parties' reasonable expectations from whatever sources they may
derive").
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do not read or comprehend. At the same time, however, standard
forms do not fall within the ambit of any wholly procedural or wholly
substantive defense. To justify their enforcement, contract law needs
a rule that strips them of dubious terms. This is where the unconscio-
nability doctrine comes in.
C. The Unconscionability Doctrine
The unconscionability doctrine can be understood as a way for
courts to refuse to enforce clauses that would harm efficiency and
autonomy interests. The doctrine has two elements: one procedural
and the other substantive.92
Procedural unconscionability looks to the circumstances sur-
rounding contract formation. Its definition varies among jurisdictions
from the bare fact that a seller offered a standard form on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis,93 to unequal bargaining power plus an inability to obtain
the goods or services elsewhere, 94 to a holistic evaluation of the par-
92 See Leff, supra note 19, at 487 (noting the procedural/substantive
dichotomoy); see also U.C.C. § 2-302 (2007) (dealing with unconscionable contracts or
terms); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (same). A similar strand
of the rule had merely prohibited specific performance of unfair terms. See, e.g.,
Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948) ("[A] party who has
offered and succeeded in getting an agreement as tough as this one is, should not
come to a chancellor and ask court help in the enforcement of its terms.").
93 See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal.
2000) (considering an employment agreement); Whitney v. Alltel Commc'ns, Inc.,
173 S.W.3d 300, 310 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (finding an arbitration provision procedur-
ally unconscionable that was sent "in the mail on a take it or leave it basis"); Muham-
mad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88, 96 (N.J. 2006) ("'[T]he
essential nature of a contract of adhesion is that it is presented on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis.... .'" (quoting Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 605 A.2d 681,
685 (N.J. 1992))); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ND, 693 N.W.2d 918, 925 (N.D.
2005) (reasoning that if "the only option presented to the other party is to take it or
leave it, some quantum of procedural unconscionability is established").
94 See, e.g., VoiceStream Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Commc'ns, Inc., 912 So. 2d 34, 40
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining that if "the purchaser of services was free to
obtain such services elsewhere [she] ... was not forced to sign the contract"); Fiser v.
Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1221 (N.M. 2008) (indicating that contract may
not have been procedurally unconscionable because "there was no evidence that
Plaintiff could not avoid doing business under the particular terms mandated by
Defendant"); Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 884 N.E.2d 12, 23 (Ohio 2008)
(affirming trial court's decision that a contract to build a house was not procedurally
unconscionable because "'[t] here are a multitude of homebuilders in the local area'"
(quoting Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, No. 2003 CVE 01565, 2005 WL
5468600, at *11 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Aug. 16, 2005))). A split of authority exists on
whether the nature of the product or service affects the analysis. Compare Pokrass v.
DirecTV Group, Inc., No. EDCV 07-423-VAP, 2008 WL 2897084, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July
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ties' standing in life95 and the disputed clause's font size. 96 Substan-
tive unconscionability focuses on what the clause at issue
accomplishes. It applies to grossly unfair clauses: those that are "'so
one-sided as to shock the conscience,' 97 or "'monstrously harsh, and
exceedingly calloused,"98 or "such as no man in his senses and not
under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and
fair man would accept on the other."99 Most states insist on at least a
minimum amount of evidence on both prongs. 00 Others employ a
14, 2008) (holding that a contract for satellite television service was not procedurally
unconscionable because "contracts for nonessential recreational activities cannot be
procedurally unconscionable"), with Stiener v. Apple Computer, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 2d
1016, 1018, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that the contract for service for an iPhone
was procedurally unconscionable).
95 See Darby Anesthesia Assocs., Inc. v. Anesthesia Bus. Consultants, LLC, No.
06-1565, 2008 WL 2845587, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 2008) ("Factors for determining
procedural unconscionability include: the parties' 'business acumen and experience
.... I" (quoting Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 133,
143 (W.D. Mich. 1992))); Honig v. Comcast of Ga. I, LLC, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1285
(N.D. Ga. 2008) (considering the "'age, education, intelligence, business acumen and
experience of the parties"' (quoting NEC Techs., Inc. v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d 769, 772
(Ga. 1996))); Swayne v. Beebles Invs., Inc., 891 N.E.2d 1216, 1223 (Ohio Ct. App.
2008) (holding that a loan agreement was procedurally unconscionable because
defendants "were in the business of brokering mortgages" and plaintiff was "a recent
widow whose husband had managed the couple's finances").
96 Compare E. Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 716-17 (Miss. 2002) (holding
that an arbitration provision was procedurally unconscionable when it was "less than
one-third the size of many other terms in the document [and] appear[ed] in very fine
print and regular type font"), with Luna v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 236 F. Supp. 2d
1166, 1176 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (rejecting a claim of procedural unconscionability
because the contract's "typeface, although smaller than that used in this Order,
appears to be approximately the size used in most newspapers"), and Bank One, N.A.
v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819, 831 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (rejecting a claim of procedural
unconscionability because the contract used "font that could be accurately character-
ized as small, if not 'tiny'" but "is legible, and consistent throughout the document").
97 Davis v. O'Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Soltani v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2001)) (emphasis omit-
ted) (applying California law).
98 Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 781 (Wash. 2004) (quoting Nelson v.
McGoldrick, 896 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Wash. 1995) (en banc)).
99 Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (quoting Earl of Chesterfield
v. Janssen, (1750) 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch.)); see also Hall v. Fruehauf Corp., 346
S.E.2d 582, 583 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (categorizing as unconscionable "such an agree-
ment as no sane man not acting under a delusion would make and that no honest
man would take advantage of" (quoting R.L. Kinsey Cotton Co. v. Ferguson, 214
S.E.2d 360, 363 (Ga. 1975))).
100 See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 666-77 (6th Cir.
2003) (applying Ohio law); Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala. v. Rigas, 923 So. 2d 1077,
1087 (Ala. 2005); Bland ex rel. Coker v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 927 So. 2d
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sliding scale and let a strong showing on the substantive prong make
up for a weak showing on the procedural prong.' 10
The two elements thus work together to identify and strike
clauses that are suboptimal and intent-thwarting because they do not
reflect fully informed buyers' ex ante preferences. Procedural uncon-
scionability acts as a gatekeeper. It weeds out language that most con-
sumers either cannot or do not factor into their purchasing decisions.
It does so by probing the legibility of the term and whether the ability
to bargain or find alternative sellers makes it worth reading. As noted
above, however, even if most consumers do not peruse the fine print,
behavioral economic theory holds that even a handful of erudite
shoppers will pressure sellers to draft majoritarian salient terms. For
this reason, procedural unconscionability alone does not invalidate a
clause. Courts must also inquire into substantive unconscionability,
which uses "extreme unfairness" as a rough proxy for nonsalience.
The logic here is that the one-sided nature of a term is strong evi-
dence that consumers did not understand its effects.
252, 257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) ("Having concluded that the trial court properly
determined that the Agreement was not procedurally unconscionable, we need not
address the issue of substantive unconscionability."); Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Uni-
versal Computer Consulting Holding, Inc., 127 P.3d 138, 141-42 (Idaho 2005) (apply-
ing Michigan law); Murphy v. Mid-West Nat'l Life Ins. Co. of Tenn., 78 P.3d 766, 768
(Idaho 2003); Myers v. Neb. Inv. Council, 724 N.W.2d 776, 799 (Neb. 2006); Nygaard
v. Sioux Valley Hosps. & Health Sys., 731 N.W.2d 184, 194-95 (S.D. 2007).
101 See, e.g., Sprague v. Household Int'l, 473 F. Supp. 2d 966, 971 (W.D. Mo.
2005); Vockner v. Erickson, 712 P.2d 379, 381-82 (Alaska 1986); Gatton v. T-Mobile
USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 350 (Ct. App. 2007); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, LLC,
828 N.E.2d 812, 818 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); MS Credit Ctr., Inc. v. Horton, 926 So. 2d
167, 177 (Miss. 2006); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 96 P.3d 1159, 1162 (Nev. 2004);
Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d 915, 923 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002);
State v. Wolowitz, 468 N.Y.S.2d 131, 145 (App. Div. 1983); Kucan v. Advance Am., 660
S.E.2d 98, 102 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) ("'[W]hile the presence of both procedural and
substantive problems is necessary for an ultimate finding of unconscionability, such a
finding may be appropriate when a contract presents pronounced substantive unfair-
ness and a minimal degree of procedural unfairness, or vice versa . . . .'" (quoting
Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 370 (N.C. 2008))); Wood-
haven Apartments v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah 1997); Roussalis v. Wyo.
Med. Ctr., Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 246-47 (Wyo. 2000).
A few courts have opined that substantive unconscionability alone can be suffi-
cient. See Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P,2d 51, 59 (Ariz. 1995) ("[A] claim of
unconscionability can be established with a showing of substantive unconscionability
alone, especially in cases involving either price-cost disparity or limitation of reme-
dies."); Am. Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886, 889 (N.H. 1964); Res.
Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1043 (Utah 1985)
("Gross disparity in terms, absent evidence of procedural unconscionability, can sup-
port a finding of unconscionability."); Adler, 103 P.3d at 782.
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Thus formulated, the rule is an exercise in accommodation: it
balances behavioral economic and autonomy values with concern for
judicial economy. Under a behavioralist regime, courts would need to
hear expert testimony and make a complex, fact-sensitive determina-
tion about salience. 10 2 By letting courts adjudicate "gross unfairness"
as a matter of law, the unconscionability doctrine approximates the
same results with less expenditure of government resources. In addi-
tion, because empirical data indicates that only about five attributes
will be salient to buyers, 10 3 making nonsalience the hallmark of
unconscionability would effectively abolish modern contracting. The
rule wisely does not do so. However, it is more permissive than it
would be if autonomy reigned supreme. Terms that buyers neither
read nor understand can only constitute the exercise of free will if
they exactly replicate what informed buyers would have selected. Any
term not concordant with buyers' reasonable expectations should be
void. Thus, an autonomy-driven unconscionability defense would
require little more than proof that a term is unreasonable. In con-
trast, the real defense hinges not just on unfairness, but "manifest
unfairness." This is a nod to the economic tenet thatjudicial interven-
tion, which imposes its own costs, will be inefficient unless it targets a
pronounced market failure.10 4 Finally, setting the bar so high discour-
ages some litigants who might otherwise be tempted to ask courts to
second-guess the equanimity of a clause. 10 5
In sum, neither utilitarian nor deontological theories justify
enforcing terms that deviate from what informed consumers would
102 See Korobkin, supra note 60, at 1280-83 ("[B]uyers might present studies that
demonstrate what percentage of customers in a particular market reported consider-
ing the term in question when making their purchase decision, selected one seller
over another because of the content of that term, or were even aware of the content
of that term in their particular contract.").
103 See id. at 1227.
104 There are three reasons why court involvement is not ideal. First, courts are
publicly subsidized and thus drain the social fisc. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 11,
at 93. Second, courts make mistakes-especially when asked to place themselves in
the contracting parties' shoes. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Con-
tract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. Rav. 1581, 1583 (2005) (discussing the costs ofjudicial
error). Third, courts can only rectify market failures through piecemeal litigation
and thus cannot "encourage markets to move toward competitive equilibria."
Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 67, at 679.
105 Indeed, a recent study of 187 published federal court opinions over the last
four decades confirmed that courts only apply the unconscionability doctrine in
about a third of the cases where it is raised. See Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis
Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FlA.
ST. U. L. REv. 1067, 1100 (2006) ("Results of our analysis revealed that unconsciona-
bility claims are difficult to win.").
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have selected ex ante. The unconscionability doctrine is a pluralist
attempt to eliminate these clauses. Like most grand compromises, it
fully satisfies almost nobody. Yet, despite the fact that calls to
recalibrate the rule are frequent, 0 6 calls to abolish it are rare. l07 This
speaks volumes about the values it seeks to protect.
These values exist in equal measure in trust law. Indeed, like con-
tracts, trust instruments outline rights and duties flowing from a trans-
fer of property. Courts honor a settlor's intent as expressed in the
instrument because doing so increases the welfare of the parties
involved and fulfills the settlor's free will. By the same token, adher-
ing to terms that do not match what a fully informed settlor would
have chosen ex ante will be suboptimal and autonomy-thwarting. But
although contract law includes the unconscionability defense, no trust
rule seeks to pinpoint and eliminate these clauses. I consider this
issue in depth in the next Part.
II. UNCONSCIONABILITY IN TRUST LAW
This Part makes the case for a trust-specific unconscionability
doctrine. It begins by explaining that freedom of testation, like free-
dom of contract, can be justified on economic and deontological
grounds. However, trust law also involves powerful countervailing pol-
icy considerations and therefore defers to an instrument's text less
often than does contract law. The unconscionability doctrine, which
voids express contractual terms to safeguard important values, would
be right at home in trust law.
Trust law does not recognize the rule largely because of the per-
ception that it is unnecessary: unlike consumers assenting to a stan-
dard form contract, settlors enjoy the benefits of attorney
representation and the ability to revise or amend the instrument. In
the last decade, however, corporate fiduciaries, trust mills, and the
self-help phenomenon have generated millions of trusts that do not fit
this mold. Complex clauses in these instruments may not reflect a
106 See Korobkin, supra note 60, at 1279-90 (proposing that courts modify the doc-
trine in a way that better reflects concerns about term salience); Amy J. Schmitz,
Embracing Unconscionability's Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73, 110-15 (2006)
(arguing that courts should not strictly adhere to the two-pronged test); Schwartz,
supra note 20, at 1054-55 (urging courts to stop using seller's market power and
consumers' economic status or sophistication as yardsticks for procedural
unconscionability).
107 One such exception is Epstein, supra note 19, at 295 (arguing that because
terms that seem unfair allow sellers to lower prices and thus may be in both parties'
interests, "the doctrine [of substantive unconscionability] tends on balance to work
more harm than good, and should therefore be abandoned").
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fully informed settlor's ex ante desires. In addition, as with standard
form contracts, settlors are boundedly rational and underestimate the
odds that fine-print trust clauses will substantially affect beneficiaries'
rights. Accordingly, courts should subject these procedurally suspect
instruments to heightened scrutiny.
Trust-specific substantive unconscionability, like its contractual
cousin, would use gross unfairness as the yardstick for detecting ineffi-
cient and intent-defeating terms. Because trusts exist to benefit the
beneficiaries, harsh clauses probably do not reflect an informed set-
tor's desires. Unfair terms may also be suboptimal: they may be
worth less to a settlor than a beneficiary would pay to get rid of them.
A. Rationales for Freedom of Testation
To some degree, rationales for freedom of testation dovetail with
those for freedom of contract. First, as noted, trusts arguably are
Pareto-superior.108 Settlors derive utility from the act of executing a
trust: some enjoy the prospect of controlling from the grave, others
take comfort in providing for loved ones.
The trust "deal" also makes trustees better off. Indeed, because
"[n] o one can be made to accept a trusteeship,"10 9 the trustee's choice
to do so confirms that, for her, the benefits outweigh the costs.
Finally, trusts enhance the welfare of beneficiaries, who gain new
property and assets. Thus, because trusts augment the well-being of
all relevant parties, courts need only regulate their content in the
event of market failure.
Second, the trust instrument permits the settlor to exercise her
free will. The settlor's posthumous dominion over her property is a
natural extension of her power over it during life. Through the trust
instrument, she expresses her individualism by selecting recipients for
her estate and conditioning the gifts.110 Indeed, courts often make
108 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
109 Langbein, supra note 8, at 650; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 169 cmt. a (1959) ("[T]he trustee is not under a duty to administer the trust unless
he accepts.").
110 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nine-
teenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1191 (1985) ("Along with liberty of contract, free
alienation is one of the keystones of the twin policies of promoting individual auton-
omy and free exchange in competitive markets.");John H. Langbein, Substantial Com-
pliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 489, 491 (1975) ("[V]irtually the entire law
of wills derives from the premise that an owner is entitled to dispose of his property as
he pleases in death as in life."); Vanessa Laird, Note, Phantom Selves: The Search for a
General Charitable Intent in the Application of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 40 STAN. L. REV. 973,
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grand statements about the settlor's autonomous prerogative to dis-
pose of her property as she sees fit."'
Moreover, permitting free testation may have both ex ante and ex
post benefits. Ex ante, the power to designate who will receive one's
assets at death adds an important stick to the bundle of property
rights. This makes property rights more desirable, which, in turn,
spurs hard work, creativity, and saving. I 12 Similarly, the threat that a
settlor will opt out of the default inheritance regime creates incentives
for children to care for aging parents. 1 3 This binds families together
and lowers the cost of publicly subsidized assistance for the elderly."14
973 (1988) (commenting on "the widespread belief that private property is an aspect
of personality subject to individual control").
111 See, e.g., In re Estate of Fritschi, 384 P.2d 656, 659 (Cal. 1963) (en banc)
("[T]he right to testamentary disposition of one's property is a fundamental one
which reaches back to the early common law."); In re Raynolds' Estate, 27 A.2d 226,
236 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1942) ("'The courts cannot reject a will because it does not
comport with their ideas of propriety and justice, or even because it appears to be
unreasonable, unjust, injudicious, or cruel."' (quoting Smith v. Smith, 25 A. 11, 19
(NJ. Prerog. Ct. 1891)) (emphasis omitted)). For a fascinating account of the histori-
cal forces that shaped this purported respect for testamentary idiosyncrasy, see
Susanna L. Blumenthal, The Deviance of the Will: Policing the Bounds of Testamentary Free-
dom in Nineteenth-Century America, 119 HARv. L. REv. 959, 1017 (2006) (explaining that
after the Civil War, "courts increasingly cast testamentary freedom in terms of the
autonomy of the will, rather than its conformity to notions of rationality and
morality").
112 See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 11, at 164 ("[R]ules that restrict transfer
undermine the owner's incentive to maximize the value of the property."); Jonathan
R. Macey, Private Trusts for the Provision of Private Goods, 37 EMORY LJ. 295, 297 (1988)
("[R]egulating how a settlor can dispose of his wealth may lead to inefficiencies
because such interference would decrease the incentive to accumulate wealth, since
influencing events and individuals after one's death may provide a primary motivation
for accumulating wealth during one's life."). Nevertheless, inherited wealth may also
reduce beneficiaries' incentives to work hard and save. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note
27, at 9. Moreover, over time, free testation also leads to "great disparities of wealth,"
which "undermine the very utility that a private property regime is supposed to fos-
ter." Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of Testamentary
Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273, 1291.
113 See, e.g., 1 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILtS § 1.7, at 35 (rev. ed. 2003) ("To bind a
person to an intestate scheme might destroy parental control, and deprive a person of
the ability to reward kindness and punish cruelty."); Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the
Insolvent Heir, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 636 (1989) ("[Tlestamentary freedom height-
ens social control, by creating incentives for obedience and loyalty to one's family.");
Hirsch & Wang, supra note 27, at 10 ("The testator's power to bequeath encourages
her beneficiaries to provide her with care and comfort-services that add to the total
economic 'pie.'").
114 See, e.g., Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42 U.C.
DAvIs L. REv. 129, 171 (2008) ("[Clhanges over the past few decades have considera-
bly strengthened the argument that society should tolerate freedom of testation
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Ex post, free testation arguably "permits more intelligent estate plan-
ning"'1  by letting a settlor distribute property according to her loved
ones' needs.
Despite the virtues of testamentary freedom, courts recognize
that not all trust instruments are consonant with these values. For
example, a trust may contain language that does not faithfully articu-
late the settlor's genuine wishes. Accordingly, the doctrine of undue
influence invalidates terms that stem from a beneficiary's overreach-
ing rather than the settlor's volition. 116 The incapacity doctrine per-
forms the same function when the settlor lacks the mental acuity
necessary to make complex decisions. 11 7 Under the doctrine of mis-
take, courts will reform an instrument upon clear and convincing evi-
dence that the drafting attorney failed to memorialize the settlor's
wishes correctly. 118 These doctrines acknowledge that a term is
unlikely to be optimal or freedom-enhancing if it does not reflect the
because it allows parents to reward children for lifetime services."). Today, however,
many children are delegating these duties to nurses and in-home caregivers. See Bar-
bara Correa, Home Sweet Home: Elderly Parents, Children Need Early Talk About Care, DAILY
NEWS (L.A.), Apr. 3, 2008, at BI (noting a spike in the "demand for home care ser-
vices, such as bathing and dressing, meal preparation and driving clients on
errands"). Despite the "caregiving" basis for testamentary freedom, lawmakers tend
to be suspicious about testamentary gifts to nonrelative caregivers. See CAL. PROB.
CODE § 21350(a) (6) (West 2007) (creating a presumption of invalidity for gifts from
"dependent adults" to "care custodians"); David Horton, The Uneasy Case for Califor-
nia's "Care Custodian" Statute, 12 CHAP. L. REv. 47, 49 (2009) (criticizing the statute).
115 Hirsch & Wang, supra note 27, at 12 (calling this the "father knows best"
hypothesis (internal quotation marks omitted)).
116 See, e.g., Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 575
(1997) ("[U] ndue influence involves the substitution of the mind of the person exer-
cising the influence for the mind of the person executing the instrument, resulting in
an instrument that would otherwise not have been made.").
117 See, e.g., Pamela Champine, Expertise and Instinct in the Assessment of Testamentary
Capacity, 51 VILL. L. REv. 25, 31 (2006) (noting that courts will apply the incapacity
defense when a settlor cannot understand the nature of the testamentary act, the
nature and extent of her property, and the natural objects of her bounty).
118 Van Riper v. Van Riper, 834 N.E.2d 239, 240 (Mass. 2005) (requiring "'full,
clear, and decisive'" evidence (quoting Putnam v. Putnam, 682 N.E.2d 1351, 1353
(Mass. 1997))); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 415 (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 514-15 (2006)
(requiring clear and convincing evidence). Courts insist on a high level of proof
because a deceased settlor "cannot corroborate or deny evidence that the words of
the will are contrary to [her] intent." Andrea W. Cornelison, Dead Man Talking: Are
Courts Ready to Listen? The Erosion of the Plain Meaning Rule, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 811, 815 (2001). Courts also distinguish between trusts (to which they will apply the
mistake defense) and wills (to which they will not). The primary rationale for this
difference is that language in a will must comply with the Statute of Wills; thus, when
a court is asked to reform a will, "the objection arises that the language to be supplied
was not written, signed, and attested as required." John H. Langbein & Lawrence W.
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settor's "authentic, autonomous choice." 11 9 In this regard, trust and
contract law are virtually identical.' 20
However, the two bodies of law take different approaches to regu-
lating an instrument's substantive effect. The root of this asymmetry
is the fact that, on closer inspection, rationales for free testation are
less persuasive than those for freedom of contract. For one, because
contracts rarely last into the distant future, it makes sense to assume
that the parties are capable of foreseeing what rights and duties will
maximize their self-interest. 2 1 Testamentary instruments, on the
other hand, often span generations. 12 2 There is less reason to defer to
a settlor's desires about a contingency that will not occur for
decades.123 In fact, the certainty that the world will change raises
thorny questions about second-order preferences: whether settlors
want (or expect) courts to follow the terms rigidly or modify them
when necessary to effectuate their essential purposes.124 Trust law
resolves this dilemma by letting beneficiaries do something contract
Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American
Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521, 528 (1982).
119 Marsha Garrison, The Empire of Illness: Competence and Coercion in Health-Care
Decision Making, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 781, 794 (2007).
120 One difference, however, is that although a mistake by the settlor can be
grounds to reform a trust, a party's unilateral mistake is generally not sufficient to
reform a contract. See, e.g., 27 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 70:27 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2003).
121 Even "relational" contracting consists of a series of freestanding agreements,
rather than one long-term commitment. See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment
of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law,
72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854, 900 (1978) (describing contracts that are "more complex and
of greater duration than discrete transactions").
122 This is especially true of trusts. For example, William Randolph Hearst's testa-
mentary trust became effective on his death in 1951. It has spawned litigation in five
of the six decades since. See Hearst v. Hearst, 123 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1954);
Hearst v. United States, 167 Ct. Cl. 513 (1964); In re Estate of Hearst, 136 Cal. Rptr.
821 (Ct. App. 1977); Hearst v. Ganzi, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 473, 475 n.4 (Ct. App. 2006)
(mentioning a 1999 case that did not result in a published opinion).
123 See Sherman, supra note 112, at 1283 ("Questions about the proper distribu-
tion and use of resources are best answered with reference to current facts and cir-
cumstances, a judgment that the dead cannot make.").
124 Compare POSNER, supra note 11, at 546 ("[A] rational donor knows that his
intentions might eventually be thwarted by unpredictable circumstances and may
therefore be presumed to accept implicitly a rule permitting modification of the
terms of the bequest in the event that an unforeseen change frustrates his original
intention."), with Macey, supra note 112, at 307 ("People forming trusts clearly will
take the possibility of unforeseen contingencies into account when creating the
trust.").
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law would never let a nonsignatory do: ask a court to reform or termi-
nate the instrument due to unanticipated circumstances.1 25
Another key difference between freedom of contract and testa-
mentary freedom is that while the parties to a deal usually suffer its
repercussions, trusts have the potential to cause negative externalities.
For example, a settlor's right to dictate how property will be used long
after her death can exact a social cost.
Even the savviest investor cannot predict how to allocate assets
efficiently in the distant future. 126 Settlor-imposed restrictions on
property use also give rise to "a basic paradox at the core of liberal
property law"1 27: the settlor's exercise of her freedom to dispose of
her property reduces the beneficiary's freedom to do the same. Trust
doctrine responds to these concerns with the rule against perpetuities,
which forbids the dead from tying up resources forever.12 8 Similarly,
trusts can create externalities by excluding certain individuals. In
some circumstances, by omitting her dependants, a settlor will deprive
them of an irreplaceable income stream and thus pass the cost of pro-
viding for them to the government. To prevent this from happening,
forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have either enacted
community property regimes or elective share statutes to protect a sur-
viving spouse from complete disinheritance. 129
125 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 507 (2006) ("The
court may modify the administrative or dispositive terms of a trust or terminate the
trust if, because of circumstances not anticipated by the settlor, modification or termi-
nation will further the purposes of the trust."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66
(2003) (reversing the longstanding rule that permitted deviation from administrative
but not dispositive terms). Compare Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454, 456 (Mass. 1889)
(denying a request to deviate from the dispositive provisions of a trust), with Carlick v.
Keiler, 375 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Ky. 1964) (disagreeing with Claflin with respect to the
administrative provisions of a trust).
126 See POSNER, supra note 11, at 549 ("[A] rrangements for the distant future [are]
likely to result in an inefficient use of resources . . . ."); Sherman, supra note 112, at
1283 ("'To regulate events in 1980 the judgment of a mediocre mind on the spot is
incomparably preferable to the guess in 1960 of the greatest man who ever lived.'"
(quoting W. BARTON LEACH & JAMES K. LOGAN, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLAN-
NING 241-42 (1961))).
127 Alexander, supra note 110, at 1189.
128 The rule against perpetuities provides that "[n]o interest is good unless it must
vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of
the interest." JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191
(Roland Gray ed., 4th ed. 1942). However, its viability is shrouded in doubt. See Rob-
ert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An
Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 359-60 (2005) (noting
that as many as twenty states have abolished the rule).
129 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 11, at 550 (arguing that elective share statutes
minimize the transaction costs of couples negotiating detailed property-sharing
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Finally, since the settlor may be dead when a trust becomes effec-
tive,' 30 a testamentary instrument, unlike a contract, raises the specter
of moral hazard. Because executing a trust is an exercise of power
without responsibility,13 1 setflors "'can sometimes be so awed by the
infinite wisdom of their own plans for the future as to feel justified
controlling other people's lives.' "132 Often this tendency manifests
itself in the relatively benign form of instructing the trustee to invest
exclusively in a specific corporation that the settlor regards highly. 133
Yet it can also include clauses that disinherit a beneficiary if she
remarries13 4 or joins a particular faith.'3 5 A final fringe category
includes settlors who mandate the destruction of their house 36 or
arrangements); Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn't I Be Allowed to Leave My Property to
Whomever I Choose at My Death? (Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Loving the
French), 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 737, 739 (2006) (noting that elective share statutes vary
widely but typically entitle the surviving spouse to between one-third and one-half of
the decedent's property). But see Sherman, supra note 112, at 1302 n.132 ("Among
American jurisdictions, only Louisiana and Puerto Rico protect children against delib-
erate disinheritance.").
130 Of course, this will not be true for irrevocable living trusts.
131 Cf Hirsch & Wang, supra note 27, at 13 (" [T]estators making private provision
for the distribution of assets at their deaths are free to behave as responsibly or irre-
sponsibly as they choose, without bearing the interpersonal costs that living persons
pay for eccentric behavior.").
132 Sherman, supra note 112, at 1284 (quoting M. Meston, The Power of the Will,
1982JuRID. REV. 172, 173).
133 See, e.g., Ams. for the Arts v. Ruth Lilly Charitable Remainder Annuity Trust,
855 N.E.2d 592, 595 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (involving a trust funded entirely with Eli
Lilly stock); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 228(b) cmt. e (2003) (providing that
when the settlor requires the trustee to invest entirely in a specific company, the trus-
tee must comply unless "compliance would be impossible ... or illegal"). For the view
that such an instruction should be invalid, see Langbein, supra note 6, at 1115
("[T]he advantages of diversification [are] so overwhelming that the settlor's interfer-
ence with effective diversification will be treated as inconsistent with the requirement
that the trust terms must be for the benefit of the beneficiaries."). But seeJeffrey A.
Cooper, Empty Promises: Settlor's Intent, the Uniform Trust Code, and the Future of Trust
Investment Law, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1165, 1175-1201 (2008) (arguing that Langbein's
approach would have several unwelcome effects).
134 See In re 1942 Gerald H. Lewis Trust, 652 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Colo. App. 1982); In
re Lambert's Estate, 46 N.Y.S.2d 905, 908 (Sur. Ct. 1944).
135 See U.S. Nat'l Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 862 (Or. 1954) (en
banc) (considering a bequest that required the beneficiary to not have "embraced,
nor become a member of, the Catholic faith"). More common are testamentary gifts
that require the beneficiary to remain within the fold. See Maddox v. Maddox's
Adm'r, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 804 (1854), available at 1854 WL 3137, at *4 (considering a
legacy that was conditioned on the beneficiary remaining Quaker).
136 For example, in Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 211-13 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1975), the testator directed her executor "to cause our home at 4 Kingsbury
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money, 13 7 or the creation of a statue garden replete with bronze repli-
cas of their family.138 Of course, individuals can freely accomplish
these objectives during life: they can keep undiversified portfolios,
ostracize children for lifestyle choices, raze their property, and build
memorials. Unlike the dead, however, the living must suffer the
financial and interpersonal consequences of these decisions. 13 9 They
can change their minds and abandon foolish plans.140 To combat the
tendency of settlors to succumb to wasteful or controlling impulses,
trust law contains a robust prohibition against terms that contravene
public policy.1 41 Unlike contract law, where "courts always proceed
with caution" when asked to invalidate a clause on this basis, 1 42 "a
large and miscellaneous group of trusts ... [are held] invalid, on the
ground that their enforcement would violate public policy."' 43
Place ... to be razed"-an act that would have reduced the value of the legacy from
$40,000 to $650. Similarly, in Brown v. Burdett, (1882) 21 Ch.D. 667, 668 (Eng.), the
testator tasked her executor with boarding, bricking, and shuttering up her house for
twenty years before transferring it to the beneficiaries.
137 See In re Scott's Will, 93 N.W. 109, 109 (Minn. 1903) (involving a term that
required the executor to "destroy all the rest and residue of the money or cash or
other evidence of credit that to me or to my estate may belong").
138 In McCaig's Trustees v. Kirk-Session of the United Free Church, 1915 Sess. Cas. 426,
434 (Scot. 2d Div.), the settlor required the trustee to construct an amphitheater not
accessible to the public that contained bronze statues of her parents and their nine
children.
139 See JEssE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 28 (7th ed. 2005)
("[A] person can, if she wishes, destroy her property during life (unless it is subject to
historic preservation or similar laws). For if she does, she bears most of the economic
consequences of her decision, plus or minus."). For example, in McCaig's Trustees, the
court struck down the requirement that the trustee build the amphitheater on the
grounds that the settlor's family had long "contemplated the erection of similar stat-
ues, but . . . could not bring themselves to part with the money during their own
lifetimes." See 1915 Sess.Cas. at 438. But see LiorJacob Strabilevitz, The Right to Destroy,
114 YALE L.J. 781, 840-41 (2005) (contending that settlors who require the trustee to
destroy property make "a real, immediate economic sacrifice" because they effectively
lose the ability to sell their interest for profit during their life).
140 See Langbein, supra note 6, at 1111 ("The living donor can always change his
or her mind, as he or she observes the consequences of an unwise course of con-
duct .... ").
141 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 (2003).
142 Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Moore, 3 F.2d 652, 653 (D. Or. 1925); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981) ("A promise or other term of
an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if ... the interest in its
enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the
enforcement of such terms.").
143 2 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL., ScoTr AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 9.3 (5th ed.
2006). Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Uniform Trust Code require
a "trust, its terms, and its administration [to] be for the benefit of its beneficiaries."
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Thus, trusts, like contracts, serve economic and individualistic
interests. Yet, more than contract law, trust law allows courts to over-
ride an instrument's express terms when necessary to reduce social
costs or protect third parties. 14 4 This recognition that the parties'
articulated intent is not sacrosanct-that it sometimes cedes to com-
peting values-is also the foundational insight of the unconscionabil-
ity doctrine. Nevertheless, trust law does not recognize the rule.
Instead, it only permits courts to void clauses for wholly procedural or
wholly substantive flaws. One cluster of defenses-incapacity, undue
influence, and mistake-responds to defects in the trust-creation pro-
cess. Another category, exemplified by the public policy doctrine,
weighs the substantive effect of a clause. The unconscionability rule,
with its two-prong procedural and substantive test, straddles both cate-
gories. As I now explain, it is able to detect inefficient and intent-
defeating clauses that the other defenses do not.
B. Unconscionability in Trust Law
As with freedom of contract, the justifications for freedom of tes-
tation assume that terms in an instrument will reflect the settlor's ex
ante preferences. For example, suppose a settlor executes a trust with
a broad exculpatory clause. If a competent attorney represents the
settlor, courts should enforce the clause. For one, the clause will be
efficient. The settlor's informed decision to include it indicates that
she has decided that its benefits outweigh its drawbacks, just as the
trustee's choice to serve signifies that the clause will make her better
off.14 5 To be sure, the beneficiaries would probably prefer that the
settlor not give the trustee so much leeway. However, they may unwit-
tingly profit from the clause. If the settlor fears that the beneficiaries
are litigious or unduly risk averse, she may not be willing to leave
them as large a gift-or provide for them at all-if she cannot insulate
the trustee from their demands. The beneficiaries would rather
accept a gift with the exculpatory clause than receive no gift whatso-
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27; see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 (amended
2005), 7C U.L.A. 484 (2006) ("A trust and its terms must be for the benefit of its
beneficiaries."). Although there is an open question about how egregious a clause
must be to violate this rule, it nevertheless "places an outside limit upon the normal
rule of deference to the settlor's intent." Langbein, supra note 6, at 1109.
144 See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 13, at 3 (noting that
contract law lets parties "be as whimsical or fanciful as they like in describing the
promise to be performed ... and the duration of the agreement"); see also Sherman,
supra note 112, at 1284-85 (contending that there should only be a "minimalist" right
to testation).
145 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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ever. Similarly, allowing the beneficiaries' wishes about the clause to
take precedence over the settlor's wishes would dilute the value of the
right to devise property. This would concomitantly diminish the value
of property rights in general and thus the motivation to be productive
and frugal. Thus, upholding the clause will serve the utilitarian goal
of wealth maximization.
Likewise, honoring the settlor's informed decision to shield the
trustee from lawsuits will be consistent with autonomy principles.
Because the settor knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the exculpa-
tory clause, respect for her free will requires a court to uphold it.146
Moreover, doing so acknowledges that the settlor is best situated to
reward (or punish) beneficiaries for their conduct and carry out
"intelligent estate planning.1 47 As noted above, the settlor may have
compelling reasons based on the beneficiaries' personalities or situa-
tions in life to immunize the trustee from damages.
These rationales dissolve if imperfect information prevents the
setflor from understanding the clause's possible ramifications. Take
the example of a cautious settlor who is dimly aware that the term
exists but does not know that it could exonerate the trustee from lia-
bility for making speculative investments. Enforcing the clause will be
inefficient. Admittedly, this issue is less clear than in contract law,
because the settlor will be dead and thus incapable of realizing that, in
contrast to her wishes, the trustee need not invest conservatively.
Indeed, a decedent cannot suffer diminished utility.148 Nevertheless,
settlors as a class will experience less satisfaction from the testamen-
146 See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
147 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
148 Cf Hirsch, supra note 113, at 637 ("The social benefits of freedom of testation
flow from the opportunity to exercise testamentary intent during the testator's lifetime.
Following the testator's death, no further behavioral utilities derive from reconstruct-
ing the testator's unexpressed intent."). Of course, a settlor who executes an irrevoca-
ble trust during her lifetime can become aware of the fact that a term deviates from
her wishes. She will be powerless to change the term because by making the instru-
ment irrevocable she has forfeited her right to amend it. In these circumstances, the
settlor will suffer welfare loss analogous to that of a contracting party who discovers ex
post that a term deviates from her ex ante preferences. One context in which this
problem may often arise is the traditional estate plan for a husband and wife with
enough property to be subject to the estate tax. Under that scheme, when the first
spouse dies, the trustee divides the estate into three trusts: a survivor's trust (which
consists of the surviving spouse's separate property); an irrevocable bypass trust
(which consists of the maximum amount that can pass tax-free at death); and a mari-
tal trust (which consists of the balance of the estate). See, e.g., JEROME A. MANNING ET
AL., MANNING ON ESTATE PLANNING § 2:2.1 (6th ed. 2008) (discussing the formation of
such a bypass trust). The surviving spouse's utility will decrease if she finds deviations
from her wishes in the bypass trust, which she cannot amend.
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tary act if they cannot be sure that the law will carry out their intent.
In turn, this will lower the value of property rights and the incentives
to produce and acquire property rights.149 Also, unlike beneficiary-
initiated modification or termination, the rule against perpetuities,
forced share statutes, and the public policy defense-other obstacles
to testamentary freedom-upholding a clause that deviates from the
settlor's ex ante preferences serves no purpose. It neither reduces
social costs nor protects third parties.
Moreover, the exculpatory clause will make the beneficiaries
worse off. Unlike the example above, the settlor did not bolster the
trustee's protection in order to give more generously to the benefi-
ciaries. In fact, the settlor was only vaguely cognizant of the clause.
Because the settlor has no stake in the term, it is worth less to her than
the amount that beneficiaries would pay to be rid of it. But bargain-
ing is impossible, leaving the settlor and beneficiaries with a clause
that neither desires. Admittedly, the term is advantageous for the
trustee, who will enjoy less risk exposure. But the trustee has far less
hanging in the balance. She may manage the property, but its profits
and costs run to the beneficiaries. Because settlors as a class will be
worse off, and the beneficiaries' welfare loss will dwarf the trustee's
meager gain, the term will be inefficient even under the Kaldor-Hicks
test. 150
The settlor's lack of informed assent to the term is also troubling
from an autonomy perspective. Because the settlor did not know she
was absolving the trustee for improvident decisions, upholding the
term will not promote her free will. To the contrary, it will reduce her
personal sovereignty over how her assets pass at death. Similarly, if
the term deviates from the settlor's desires, it will foil her efforts to
create a meritocracy based on the beneficiaries' conduct or disperse
assets in the manner that they will be most valued.15 1 For instance, a
settlor with loving, mature children may undeservedly hinder their
enjoyment of her estate by inadvertently liberating the trustee from a
duty of due care.
Therefore, no basis for freedom of testation supports enforcing a
term that deviates from what the settlor would have chosen with better
information. Upholding such a clause will not further trust law's ani-
149 See supra note 112.
150 Unlike Pareto efficiency, which requires a transaction to make all parties better
off and no one worse off, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency merely requires that "the gainers
gain more than the losers lose." COOTER & UtEN, supra note 11, at 47; see also POSNER,
supra note 11, at 13 ("The winners could compensate the losers, whether or not they
actually do.").
151 See supra note 113.
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mating values; in fact, it will harm them. However, these inefficient
and autonomy-thwarting terms do not necessarily fall within the ambit
of any procedural or substantive defense. Because the settlor's failure
to grasp "the legal import of language used[] will not normally sup-
port a claim for reformation,"1 5 2 our risk-averse settlor cannot invoke
the mistake doctrine to narrow the broad exculpatory clause. 153 Nor
will the breadth of the exculpatory term, by itself, violate public pol-
icy. 15 4 Thus, there is a hole in trust law in the shape of the unconscio-
152 Carlson v. Sweeney, 868 N.E.2d 4, 19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Peterson v.
First State Bank, 737 N.E.2d 1226, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)). In some jurisdictions,
this rule applies to all trusts. See, e.g., Seufert v. Mulzer, No. IP 99-1237-C T/G, 2000
WL 1358527, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 19, 2000) ("[U]nder Indiana law a unilateral mis-
take as to the legal effect of the terms of a trust gives no right for reformation of the
trust."); duPont v. S. Nat'l Bank of Houston, 575 F. Supp. 849, 859 (S.D. Tex. 1983)
("[N]o Texas court has rescinded or revoked a trust on the ground that the settlor
was induced to create the trust by a subjective or objective mistake of law at the time
of its creation."), affd in relevant part, 771 F.2d 874, 884 n.9 (5th Cir. 1985). A recent
trend, however, limits this rule to "[w]here no consideration is involved in the crea-
tion of a trust." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 62 cmt. a (2003). This exempts
the declaration of trust, where the settlor simply names herself as trustee and transfers
title to herself in that capacity. It probably does not exempt trusts that name a corpo-
ration as the initial trustee.
153 Another reason that the mistake defense is inadequate to regulate terms that
deviate from an informed settlor's ex ante preferences is the requirement of clear and
convincing proof. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. If the settlor is still
alive, she will almost certainly not seek reformation unless a dispute has arisen. If that
is the case, however, a court may question the credibility of her testimony. See, e.g.,
Walton v. Bank of Cal., Nat'l Ass'n, 32 Cal. Rptr. 856, 867 (Ct. App. 1963) (denying a
settlor's petition to reform a trust because her strenuous denials that she understood
the gift tax consequences of the instrument "merely created a conflict in the evi-
dence"). On the other hand, if the settlor has died, the beneficiaries will have
extreme difficulty proving that she formulated a specific belief about the meaning of
an esoteric clause. See, e.g., In re Trust Created by Isvik, 741 N.W.2d 638, 647-48
(Neb. 2007) (denying the beneficiaries' request to reform a trust even though numer-
ous witnesses testified that the settlor mistakenly sought to revoke it).
154 See, e.g., Ams. for the Arts v. Ruth Lilly Charitable Remainder Annuity Trust,
855 N.E.2d 592, 595 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding an exculpatory clause that
allowed a trustee not to diversify trust assets); Hanson v. Minette, 461 N.W.2d 592, 597
(Iowa 1990) (enforcing a clause that liberated a trustee "for any loss sustained
through any error of judgment"); In re Trusteeship of Williams, 591 N.W.2d 743, 747
(Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting a public policy-based argument that corporate trust-
ees cannot invoke exculpatory clauses); Am. Cancer Soc'y v. Hammerstein, 631
S.W.2d 858, 864 n.6 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) ("An exculpatory clause is valid and not
contrary to public policy and is enforceable absent a showing that the settlor was
improperly induced to insert it."); Bauer v. Bauernschmidt, 589 N.Y.S.2d 582, 583
(App. Div. 1992) ("[E]xculpatory provisions like those in the present case are valid in
inter vivos trusts so long as there is some accountability, at least, to the settlor."); Tex.
Commerce Bank, N.A. v. Grizzle, 96 S.W.3d 240, 250-51 (Tex. 2002) (holding that
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nability doctrine. In the section below, I develop my claim that trust
law's exclusion of the rule flows from outmoded perceptions of how
trusts come to be and what kinds of terms they contain.
1. Procedural Unconscionability
The purpose of the trust-specific procedural unconscionability
element should be to identify terms that are not what an informed
settlor would have chosen. Thus, as I will discuss, it should be cali-
brated to detect informational defects in the trust-creation process.
Of course, as mentioned, the conventional wisdom is that attorney
draftsmanship and the settlor's ability to revise and amend the instru-
ment protect against such flaws. In the next section, I will show that
informational defects in trust instruments are surprisingly common.
a. The Rise of the Procedurally Suspect Trust
In the last decade, the number of traditional, lawyer-drafted
trusts has declined. Increasingly, settlors are turning to pre-printed
instruments prepared by corporate trustees and trust mills, or creating
their own dispositive schemes with the help of advanced estate plan-
ning products. The result has been trusts that are replete with eso-
teric terms-especially those that enlarge the trustee's powers, impose
forfeitures on contesting beneficiaries, and require arbitration-but
lack attorney oversight.
i. Corporate Trustees
Corporate trusteeship is one the most profitable niches in the
financial services industry. As of 2005, banks and trust companies
held more than $3.3 trillion of assets in trust-a figure projected to
swell to $7 trillion by 2010.155 Brokerages such as Charles Schwab and
"public policy, as expressed by the Legislature in the Trust Code, does not preclude a
settlor from relieving a corporate trustee from liability for self-dealing"); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 (1959) ("[T] he trustee, by provisions in the
terms of the trust, can be relieved of liability for breach of trust.").
155 Press Release, Charles Schwab Corp., Schwab Institutional Readies Two New
Trust Services to Help Advisors Win and Retain Assets (Oct. 29, 2007), available at
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/10-
29-2007/0004692112; cf Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 10, at 682 (placing the
figure at about $1 trillion). The industry has grown steadily throughout the twentieth
century. See Note, Institutionalized Trusteeship: Avenues of Compensation Reform, 58 YALE
L.J. 924, 924 n.5 (1949) (noting that there were 569 trust companies holding about $1
billion in 1895 and nearly 3000 trust companies holding over $36 billion by 1947); see
also John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best
Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 970 (2005) ("Across the twentieth century the trust devel-
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Merrill Lynch have recently scrambled to open and bolster their own
trust departments. 156 While institutional trustees were once the prov-
ince of the wealthy, competition has reduced the size of the average
corporate-handled estate to a comparatively modest $250,000.157 As a
result, "[t]oday, the vast majority of trusts are administered by large
financial institutions. 158
These companies offer many advantages, from investment exper-
tise to deep pockets to greater longevity than individual trustees.1 59
Yet there is some evidence that they occasionally will refuse to serve
unless the setflor agrees to their standard trust instrument.1 60 A set-
tlor in that situation often will not seek out the advice of an indepen-
dent attorney and is thus indistinguishable from a consumer faced
with a purchasing decision tied to a standard form contract. In addi-
tion, even if the institution refers the settlor to an outside attorney,
she nevertheless may not receive the benefit of zealous advocacy.
Commentators have long expressed concern about the "symbiotic
relationship" between some financial service companies and law
firms. 16 1 Because corporate fiduciaries can select not only the draft-
oped its characteristic modern form as a management regime for a portfolio of finan-
cial assets, often professionally administered by a bank trust department or other
institutional trustee." (footnote omitted)).
156 See Indraneel Sur, Banks, Brokerages See Growing Opportunity in Managing Estates,
L.A. TIMES, May 28, 2000, at C1 (noting that Schwab acquired U.S. Trust and its $86
billion portfolio of trust assets and Merrill Lynch acquired $12 billion of trust assets in
the span of a decade); see also Brooke Southall, U.S. Bust? Schwab Trust Offering Due,
INVESTMENT NEWS, Sept. 11, 2006, at 1 ("'People with a lot of money are going to die,
and that's the key."' (quoting Charles Godlman, Chief Operating Officer of Schwab
Institutional)).
157 See Mike McNamee, Keeping Trusts Out of Harn's Way, Bus. WK., Apr. 10, 2000,
at 228.
158 Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL
L. REv. 767, 775 (2000).
159 See Langbein, supra note 8, at 639 (explaining that a trust company's wealth
effectively insures the corpus and its ability to "outlive [the] trust" saves the settlor
from providing for multiple alternate successor trustees); Judy B. Rosener, Matters at
Hand, ORANGE CoUNTY REG.,July 16, 2007, 2007 WLNR 15733005 (noting that a trus-
tee can act as a buffer between feuding family members). But see Fran Hawthorne,
Breaking Up Is Hard to Do, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008, at H2 (reporting that
"[d]issatisfaction with trustees-particularly corporate trustees rather than individu-
als-has been growing over the last five years"); Merri Rudd, Four Readers Writing
About Wills, Trusts, and Deeds, ALBUQUERQUEJ., Mar. 15, 2007, at 7 (describing frustra-
tion at turnover rates within trust companies).
160 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
161 Marvin B. Sussman et al., Will Making: An Examination of Client and Lawyer Atti-
tudes, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 25, 45-46 (1970) (noting the perception among trusts and
estates counsel that "a conspiracy exist[s] between the banks and large law firms").
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ing attorney, but also the attorney who administers the estate, they
provide a lucrative wellspring of business. 162 This gives lawyers the
"disincentive to argue too vociferously [if] institutions . . . wish to
modify fiduciary obligations." 163 Thus, in some circumstances, even
represented settlors may go without the benefits of truly independent
legal advice.
Moreover, although settlors, like all consumers, are free to shop
among rival banks, brokerages, or trust companies, they likely cannot
exert the market pressure necessary to discipline these firms to offer
favorable boilerplate. First, settlors may evaluate competing trust ser-
vices (not to mention competing trust boilerplate) less often than typi-
cal consumers weigh various alternatives. Many middle- and upper-
class individuals decide to execute estate plans after years of entrust-
ing a specific institution with overseeing their finances. In fact, set-
tlors often create trusts at the urging of their investment advisor. 164
Because the act takes place in the context of a preexisting relation-
ship, settlors may never look elsewhere for drafting or fiduciary
services.
In addition, even settlors who do shop will invariably fixate on
salient issues such as brand name1 65 and the trustee's fee schedule. 166
Because settlors, like standard form buyers, engage in selective and
noncompensatory decisionmaking, they will ignore nonsalient boiler-
plate language, such as clauses that exculpate the trustee or authorize
it to use trust funds to defend itself in litigation. In fact, these types of
For example, Northern Trust, the nation's largest trust company, offers on its website
to "suggest for your consideration a number of qualified attorneys." Northern Trust
Corp., Living Trusts-Northern Trust, http://www.ntrs.com/pws/jsp/display2.jsp?
XML=]pages/nt/0402/44668330_3556.xml&TYPE=interior (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
See also Lisa Shidler, Advisers Pressing to Handle Greater Amount of Trust Biz, INVEST-
MENTNEWS, May 22, 2006, at 1, 1-2 (noting that financial advisers frustrated with law-
yers "suggest[ing] that large trust companies administer a trust" are "clamoring to
grab and administer more trusts").
162 See Gerald P. Johnston, An Ethical Analysis of Common Estate Planning Practices-
Is Good Business Bad Ethics?, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 57, 119 (1984) (noting that financial
institutions usually tap the drafting attorney to handle estate administration, which
makes their referrals all the more valuable).
163 Leslie, supra note 31, at 2716.
164 See id. at 2715.
165 For a discussion of how reputation, advertising, and word of mouth can shape
consumer perception in the insurance context, see Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liabil-
ity Theoy for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389,
1414-15 (2007).
166 See, e.g., Ashlea Ebeling, Do You Trust a Trust?, FoREs, Dec. 8, 2003, at 214
(advising consumers to "[s]hop around-fees vary widely, particularly for small
trusts").
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dispute-resolution terms are at the crossroads of three well-docu-
mented sources of bounded rationality. First, since individuals deny
their own mortality, they experience discomfort when confronted with
it directly.1 67 They spend less than an ideal amount of time planning
for posthumous events. For example, studies reveal that a substantial
percentage of people inexplicably fail to create estate plans, 168
purchase adequate life insurance,1 69 or reduce taxes through annual
exclusion gifts.1 70 Since people "'prefer to minimize even [their] cog-
nitive encounters with death,' ,,1 7 1 it would be surprising if they metic-
ulously compared various trust providers' fine print terms.
Second, research indicates that "emotion laden" product attrib-
utes-those that require the decisionmaker to confront unpleasant
contingencies-tend to be nonsalient 1 72 For instance, a prospective
car buyer will experience a visceral negative emotional response if
asked to choose whether to pay more for extra safety features.1 73 As a
result, buyers will employ "non-compensatory decisionmaking strate-
gies that allow them to avoid making such tradeoffs.' 1 74 This occurs
most frequently for choices that are transparent to the public and thus
subject to ex post scrutiny. 175 Arguably, clauses that govern litigation
167 The best known work in this vein is ERNEST BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH 15
(1973) (presenting "a network of arguments based on the universality of the fear of
death").
168 See, e.g., Am. Ass'n Retired Persons, Where There Is a Will . . . 7 (Apr. 2000),
available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/will.pdf (reporting that more than
a third of persons over fifty years of age had neither a will, trust, nor a durable power
of attorney); Nathan Roth, The Psychiatry of Witing a Will, 41 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY
245, 246 (1987) ("If the prevalent opinion is that a majority of us deny our own cer-
tainty of death, then it can come as no surprise that so many people die intestate.").
169 See, e.g., Joel Slemrod, Thanatology and Economics: The Behavioral Economics of
Death, 93 Am. EcoN. REv. 371, 372 (2003) (noting that studies show "significant
declines in living standards and increases in poverty rates among women whose hus-
bands had passed away").
170 As many as two-thirds of individuals subject to the estate tax "do not take
advantage of the tax savings available through inter vivos giving." Lee Anne Fennell,
Death, Taxes, and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REv. 567, 574 (2003).
171 Wojciech Kopczuk & Joel Slemrod, Denial of Death and Economic Behavior, 5
ADVANCES THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 1 (2005) (quoting ROBERT KASTENBAUM, THE PSY-
CHOLOGY OF DEATH 98 (3d ed. 2000)).
172 See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 60, at 1231-32; Mary Frances Luce, Choosing to
Avoid: Coping with Negatively Emotion-Laden Consumer Decisions, 24 J. CONSUMER RES.
409, 427 (1998) ("[C]hoice may also be influenced by a concern with minimizing
negative emotion.").
173 See, e.g., Aimee Drolet & Mary Frances Luce, The Rationalizing Effects of Cognitive
Load on Emotion-Based Trade-off Avoidance, 31 J. CONSUMER REs. 63, 63 (2004).
174 Korobkin, supra note 60, at 1231.
175 See Luce, supra note 172, at 411.
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over the settlor's estate fit this bill. For one, a settlor will likely find
the prospect of her family and loved ones squabbling over her fortune
inimical to the peace of mind a trust is supposed to bring and thus
quite distressing. To avoid thinking about this outcome, she may
ignore the existence of dispute-resolution clauses. She may also wish
to suppress the recognition that certain terms empower the trustee at
the beneficiaries' expense. Thus, even if she shops among corporate
fiduciaries, she may not factor these clauses into her decision.
Third, even if dispute-resolution terms are salient to a particular
settlor, she may underestimate their value and not demand an appro-
priate concession from the trustee in return. Indeed, "[o]ne of the
most robust findings of social science research on judgment and deci-
sionmaking is that individuals are quite bad at taking into account
probability estimates. ' 176 For example, experiments reveal that the
"optimistic bias" causes individuals to misjudge the odds that an
adverse event will happen to them.177 Similarly, the "availability heu-
ristic" creates the belief that a specific harm is unlikely to materialize if
it is unfamiliar or difficult to conceptualize. 178 Settlors who have had
no previous experience with lawsuits may thus assume that their estate
too will be immune. As a result, they may not consider terms that
excuse the trustee from a duty of due care or let the trustee defend
litigation with trust funds to be significant. Accordingly, informa-
tional asymmetries are possible even when a settlor shops along this
specific margin.
In sum, when a corporate trustee provides the terms of an instru-
ment, or refers the settlor to an attorney with whom it enjoys a cozy
relationship, the settlor is analogous to a standard form consumer.
Corporate fiduciary drafters or attorneys who are beholden to them
have no incentive to create nonsalient terms that mirror settlors'
desires. Instead, they will exploit settlor myopia and draft clauses that
deviate from settlors' preferences and thus are inefficient and auton-
omy-thwarting.
176 Korobkin, supra note 60, at 1232.
177 Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 656 (1999) (noting that individuals
"underestimate their own chance of suffering some adverse outcome even when they
accurately state or even overstate everyone else's chance of suffering that same out-
come"); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39J. PERSONAL-
try & Soc. PSYCHOL. 806, 809-12 (1980).
178 "A person is said to employ the availability heuristic whenever he estimates
frequency or probability by the ease with which instances or associations come to
mind." Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Fre-
quency and Probability, inJUDCMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 163, 164 (Daniel Kahneman
et al. eds., 1982).
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b. Trust Mills
Another source of informational defects in instruments is the
trust mill. Trust mills are corporations run by nonlawyers that "churn
out a high volume of cookie-cutter living trusts." 179 Even though trust
mills only emerged in the mid-1990s, °8 0 by the end of that decade they
had generated an estimated four million so-called "mill trusts." 18'
Many trust mills are really schemes to sell deferred annuities and
other unsuitable investments to elders.18 2 Casting themselves as
"estate planners" or "senior experts,"1 83 these nonlawyer salesmen tar-
get elders through ads, direct mailing, telemarketing, and seminars in
179 Premack, supra note 32.
180 In 1996, California brought a high-profile lawsuit against the Alliance for
Mature Americans: a now-defunct trust mill that purportedly chose its name in the
hope that seniors would conflate it with the American Association of Retired Persons.
See Catherine Bridge, Taking Aim at Annuities, RECORDER, May 22, 2000, at 1; Sheryl
Harris, A Living Trust? Beware of Scams, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 12, 2002, at El
(noting that trust mills "frequently use 'sound-alike' names so people confuse them
with legitimate nonprofits or falsely indicate a connection with well-known groups").
181 See, e.g., Kathy M. Kristof, Seniors Warned Against Fast-Talking Living Trust Sellers,
L.A. TIMES, June 15, 2000, at C4 (reporting on a living trust scam that may have
reached up to four million low-income senior citizens); Darla Mercado, Settlement
Reached in 'Living Trust Mill' Suit, INVESTMENTNEws.cOM, July 21, 2008, www.invest-
mentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080721 /reg/383987327/1077/toc
(reporting that 24,000 Kentucky seniors purchased trusts from a particular mill);
Nancy Weaver Teichert, Suit Targets 'Trust Mills, ' SACRAMEENTo BEE, Feb. 11, 2005, at
A3 (discussing a lawsuit brought by the California attorney general on behalf of "tens
of thousands of seniors" against a mill that "has between 250 and 300 agents operat-
ing in 11 cities along with 80 telemarketers operating out of a call center"); Press
Release, Minn. Att'y Gen., Swanson Files Suit Against American Family Legal Plan and
Heritage Marketing and Insurance Services (Mar. 7, 2007), available at http://
www.ag.state.mn.us/Consumer/PressRelease/AmericanFamilyLegalPlan.asp (noting
that a mill sold thirty trusts a week to Minnesota seniors).
182 See, e.g., Death Planning Made Difficult: The Danger of Living Trust Scams: Hearing
Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 106th Cong. 2 (2000) (testimony of Paul F. Hancock,
Deputy Att'y Gen. for South Florida), available at http://aging.senate.gov/events/
hr53ph.pdf ("[Plersons seeking to 'sell' revocable living trusts with a 'one-size-fits-all'
trust are not advancing the best interest of the 'buyer' . ).. ; Kathy M. Kristof, Con
Artists' Old Tricks, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2007, at C1, C4 ("Although living trusts can
help avoid probate, state securities authorities maintain that con artists establish 'trust
mills' to simply get a good look at a senior's assets.").
183 Rick Jurgens, Many Seniors Easy Targets for Financial Abuse, CoNrRA COSTA
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2004, at Al; Press Release, Office of the Cal. Att'y Gen., Living Trust
Mills, http://ag.ca.gov/consumers/general/living-trustmills.php (last visited Feb. 1,
2009) ("[T]hese sales agents often pose as expert financial or estate planners. They
pass themselves off as a 'trust advisor,' 'senior estate planner' or 'paralegal[]'.....).
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motel rooms or community centers.' 18 4 Many go door-to-door in gray-
ing neighborhoods.18 5 Their sales presentations greatly exaggerate
the cost of probate and the advantages of creating a trust.'8 6 Some
offer trusts for $399-an amount, not coincidentally, one dollar less
than the minimum in many states for a felonious transaction.18 7
Once a senior buys the product, the mill agent schedules two
meetings. The first, which focuses on the senior's testamentary
wishes, allows the agent to learn about the senior's assets and
income.188 The agent then inserts specific dispositive provisions into
a pre-printed instrument.1 89 Occasionally the senior "receives one
short telephone call" from an attorney affiliated with the mill. 190 The
lawyer neither meets the elder nor "ask[s] ... estate-related ques-
tions."'191 With other mills, the attorney has no contact with the
senior, and merely gives the finished trust a perfunctory glance. I92
The agent visits the senior again, ostensibly to supervise the execution
184 SeeJosh Friedman, State Says Company Tricked Seniors, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005,
at Cl; Matt Smith, Son of Super Swindler, S.F. WKLY., Sept. 10-16, 2003, at 18, 21
("These firms routinely take out half-and full-page advertisements-touting two-a-day
seminars week after week, year after year-in major newspapers."); Nancy Weaver
Teichert, 'Living-Trust Mills' Under Attack, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 10, 2005, at Al
(reporting on an entity "touting low-cost trusts that held nearly 30 seminars in the
Sacramento area in one recent week").
185 See Harris, supra note 180; RickJurgens, JFK Clinic Strives to Halt Abuse of Elders,
CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006, at F4.
186 See Rick Jurgens, Seniors' Assets an Easy Target, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Dec. 19,
2004, at Al, A10 (quoting trust mill agents as telling audiences in hotels and fraternal
organization conference rooms that "you can control your entire estate from the
other side," "[t]here are no disadvantages of any kind by having a trust," "[i]f you've
got love in your heart, you need a trust," and "I'm just trying to scare you to get a trust
today").
187 See Ryan Huff & Randy Myers, When More than Memories Are Stolen, CONTRA
COSTA TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, at Al, A10; see also Cal. Penal Code § 594 (West Supp.
2009) (setting forth a $400 threshold for felony treatment of vandalism).
188 See, e.g., Jan Warner &Jan Collins, Trusting 'Trust' Mills Creates Problems, Pirrs-
BURGH POsT-GAZETIE, Aug. 14, 2007, at C2 (describing the abusive tactics used by con
artists in the area).
189 See, e.g., Huff & Myers, supra note 187 (describing such a process).
190 Press Release, Minn. Att'y Gen., supra note 181.
191 Id.
192 See Estate of Swetmann, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457, 460 n.3 (Ct. App. 2000) ("In the
past several years, mounting criticism has been leveled at the marketing of living trusts
by nonlawyers with only cursory oversight by attorneys."); Premack, supra note 32
("[A] company in another city (often another state) prepares boilerplate trust forms
and an attorney somewhere in Texas (whom you have never met and who is acting in
violation of ethical rules) signs off on the documents.").
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of the trust, but actually to persuade the senior to invest in deferred
annuities or so-called "promissory notes."'19 3
The debate over trust mills so far has centered on facts that ham-
string states' ability to regulate them: the cost of prosecution, 194 the
nebulousness of the rules that define unlicensed practice of law, 195
and the shame that prevents many elderly victims from coming for-
ward. 196 However, the actual mill trusts, which have just begun to
trickle into courts, will also pose serious problems. Trust mills "gener-
ally do a dreadful job of drafting"197 and "rarely accomplish the set-
tlor's objectives."' 98 Recently, in In re Estate of Oswald,199 a California
appellate court considered a mill trust that purported to leave the set-
tlor's estate to his beloved brother, but contained no property whatso-
ever.200 Despite abundant evidence that the settlor wanted his
brother to inherit the estate, the court felt constrained to rule that the
assets passed by intestacy. 20 1 Thus, mill trusts can fail to capture a
settlor's intent on quotidian issues such as trust funding.
193 Press Release, Office of the Cal. Att'y Gen., supra note 183. Deferred annuities
are inappropriate investments for elders because they remain illiquid for years. See,
e.g., Negrete v. Fid. & Guar. Life Ins. Co., 444 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 2006)
(denying motion to dismiss complaint against trust mill that allegedly sold lead plain-
tiff an annuity that would not mature until he was ninety-eight years old).
194 See Sande L. Buhai, Act Like a Lauryer, Be Judged Like a Lawyer: The Standard of
Care for the Unlicensed Practice of Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 87, 109; Jurgens, supra note
183 ("In an ongoing 'whack-a-mole' game, regulators and consumer advocates take
legal action against individuals and companies that bend or break the rules to prey
upon vulnerable seniors, only to see the same or similar predators pop up again
elsewhere.").
195 See Angela M. Vallario, Living Trusts in the Unauthorized Practice of Law: A Good
Thing Gone Bad, 59 MD. L. REv. 595, 600 (2000) ("A clear definition of what consti-
tutes the practice of law does not exist ....").
196 See Buhai, supra note 194, at 109; Huff & Myers, supra note 187 ("Only one in
100 cases of elder financial abuse gets reported, according to the California Welfare
Directors Association."); Kristof, supra note 182 ("Because [seniors are] embarrassed
or infirm ... they're far less likely to report and pursue prosecution of the criminal.").
197 Dobris, supra note 7, at 565; see also Francine Brevetti, Trusts Crucial to Estate
Planning, SAN MATEo CouNTY TIMEs, June 9, 2006, at Business 8 ("'[Trust mills] give
you a form that they say will work for everybody, but it doesn't work for anybody.'"
(quoting attorney Kathleen Durrans)).
198 Vallario, supra note 195, at 596 (footnote omitted).
199 No. Al17034, 2008 WL 727656 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2008).
200 Id. at *1-2.
201 The settlor executed a pour-over will, but failed to have it witnessed. In the
trial court, the brother, Miles, offered "uncontradicted evidence of his close relation-
ship with [the settlor], and of [the settlor's] frequent statements ...that he was
leaving all of his assets to Miles and Miles's sons." Id. at *2. The settlor's other sib-
lings "put on no evidence." Id.; see also Foster, Privacy, supra note 4, at 591 (describ-
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Because trust mills are generally not involved in estate administra-
tion, they have no impetus to draft terms that favor a particular party.
In this regard, mill trusts differ from instruments created by corporate
fiduciaries. Indeed, trust mills gain nothing by drafting nonsalient
terms that advantage the trustee. Nevertheless, two novel features of
mill trusts likely breed inefficient and nonmajoritarian terms. First,
settlors cannot shop for favorable mill trust clauses. Indeed, like a
"rolling" contract, a mill trust arrives after the sale. 20 2 As a result, trust
mills have little incentive to tailor terms to settlors' preferences.
Doing so will not attract more business. Unlike corporate trustee
drafters, then, trust mills are immune from market pressure to inter-
nalize settlors' wishes.
Second, mill trusts are notoriously overinclusive. An attorney-
drafted trust rarely exceeds thirty pages. Yet to foster the illusion of
legal authenticity, mill trusts can be up to one hundred pages long.20 3
Trust mills fill this massive canvas with a veritable encyclopedia of
terms, including the most controversial provisions in trust law. Often
the mere existence of a term can be suboptimal. For example, a mill
trust with a no-contest clause-a term the settlor is unlikely to under-
stand-can seriously affect beneficiaries' rights. Thus, even if trust
mills do not draft self-serving clauses, the sheer amount of boilerplate
language in their products raises doubts about whether they embody
settlors' wishes.
c. The Second-Generation Do-it-Yourself Movement
A less sinister (but equally striking) trend is the resurgence of
self-help. Since the 1965 publication of Norman Dacey's pointedly
titled bestseller How to Avoid Probate,20 4 many Americans have fash-
ioned their own estate plans. In recent years, however, "the use of do-
ing "Florida children [who] learned only after their mother's death that she had
purchased from an out-of-state trust mill a revocable trust that was invalid under Flor-
ida law").
202 Rolling contracts are valid because they "typically give the buyer a right to
return a purchased item or cancel a purchased service to avoid the transaction." Ste-
phen E. Friedman, Improving the Rolling Contract, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 4 (2006); see,
e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing the
rolling contract concept in the computer software context); ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing examples of rolling contracts).
203 See Warner & Collins, supra note 188 (reporting a hundred-page mill trust).
204 See NORMAN F. DAcEY, How TO AVOID PROBATE (1965). Dacey was tried and
acquitted for the unauthorized practice of law. See N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n v.
Dacey, 234 N.E.2d 459, 459 (N.Y. 1967). See also Foster, Privacy, supra note 4, at 558
n.20 (noting that "'do-it-yourself' trust books and software have been 'heavily mar-
keted'" since the publication of Dacey's book); Langbein, supra note 2, at 1116 (not-
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it-yourself estate planning documents and software has exploded." 20 5
This "boom in homegrown estate planning"2 0 6 stems from a number
of sources: rising legal fees, interactive software, and growing comfort
with online financial management. 20 7
Statistics from the last few years alone are telling. In 2006,
downloads of Quicken WillMaker-a full-service program that allows
consumers to create wills, trusts, and powers of attorney-increased by
a third.2 0 8 In 2007, website LegalZoom.com saw a seventy-three per-
cent rise in sales of its estate planning products. 20 9 In 2008, tax colos-
sus H&R Block joined the fray with an Internet service that allows
"everyday people [to] write their own wills, trusts and estate plans at
home."210 Finally, in less than a decade, We the People, a franchise
that prepares legal documents, has expanded from twenty-five stores
to 110 locations 211 in thirty-two states.212
ing the "depth of public dissatisfaction with probate" since the publication of Dacey's
book).
205 Dan Heilman, No Room for Shortcuts, MINN. LAW., Dec. 31, 2007.
206 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
207 See id. (ascribing the movement to "the increasing sophistication of software
and services for estate planning, combined with growing consumer comfort with
online financial management"); Claudia Buck, Write a Will or Risk Having Strangers
Decide Your Affairs, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 3, 2008, at GI (describing how "online
documents have evolved according to customers' requests"); Holly Hubbard Preston,
It's the Ultimate in Planning, If You Will, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,Jan. 13, 2007, at 17 (noting
that law firms charge between $2000 and $10,000 for an estate plan, but online prod-
ucts cost as little as $45).
208 See Claudia Buck, Matters of Life, Death, KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 23, 2008, at D3.
Executing an instrument using WillMaker takes about half an hour. See Phuong Cat
Le, A Will Is a Must for Parents with Minor Children, SEA-TLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar.
25, 2008, at Cl.
209 See Larson, supra note 33. LegalZoom offers a "'Peace of Mind Review'" by a
"legal specialist." Gail Rosenblum, Where There's a Will, There's a Headache, MINNEAPO-
LIS STAR TRiB., July 7, 2008, at El. In actuality, these "reviewers are not lawyers" but
rather "law students or other college graduates." Larson, supra note 33. Other simi-
lar Internet providers include LegacyWriter.com, BuildaWill.com, see Emily Brandon,
How to Write a Will Online, USNEws.coM, Nov. 12, 2007, http://www.usnews.com/arti-
cles/business/retirement/2007/11/12/how-to-write-a-will-online.html, ItsMyLife.
com, and SuzeOrman.com, see Jim Miller, Creating a Will Doesn't Require a Lawyer,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, Jan. 14, 2008, at 2D.
210 Gene Meyer, Without Lawyer's Help: Companies See Potential Sales in Do-It-Yourself
Legal Kits, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 20, 2008, at G3.
211 See Larson, supra note 33.
212 Francine Brevetti, Chain Helps People File Legal Papers, OAKLAND TRIB., May 15,
2006, 2006 WLNR 8344718. Some lawyers have gone to great lengths to compete. See
Michael Pollick, Attorney's New Web Site Offers Wills for $45, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB.,
Aug. 14, 2006, at 9 (describing a Florida law firm that promised to charge "online
customers" $45 for a will).
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Of course, homemade estate plans are not inherently suspect.
Indeed, twenty-seven states admit holographic wills-those that are
handwritten and not witnessed-to probate.2 13 Courts have even
honored dispositions located in a chili recipe 2 14 and scratched into a
tractor fender.2 15
Holographs, though, tend to be extraordinarily simple. For
example, a study of 145 such wills admitted to probate in Allegheny
County, Pennsylvania found that "[t]he overwhelming majority of tes-
tators . . . record[ed] the entire sweep of their final wishes with less
than a page of writing, and a significant minority needed fewer than
half-a-dozen sentences." 216 Trusts can rarely be so straightforward.
While wills generally make outright gifts, trusts are "projected on the
plane of time and so subjected to a management regime. ' 217 This
need for trusts to spell out a detailed administrative scheme makes
trusts more complex. It also raises the risk of informational defects.
And indeed, a signature trait of next-generation books and
software is their level of sophistication. Leading do-it-yourself manu-
als advise settlors on how to create spendthrift trusts, no contest
clauses, and arbitration clauses.2 18 Similarly, self-help pioneer Nolo
Press recently unveiled plans to offer "deep and detailed content...
213 See Richard Lewis Brown, The Holograph Problem-The Case Against Holographic
Wills, 74 TENN. L. REv. 93, 93 n.2 (2006). As Brown's article illustrates, holographs
remain controversial. See id. at 123 (arguing that homemade wills give rise to validity
and interpretation disputes); see also Gail Boreman Bird, Sleight of Handwriting: The
Holographic Will in California, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 605, 632 (1981) (arguing that statutory
fill-in will forms constitute "consumer fraud"). But see Stephen Clowney, In Their Own
Hand: An Analysis of Holographic Wills and Homemade Willmaking, 43 REAL PROP. TR. &
EST. L.J. 27, 70-71 (2008) (examining all holographic wills probated in a five-year
period and concluding that they are no more likely to spark litigation than other
testamentary instruments).
214 The handwritten document purportedly read:
"4 quarts of ripe tomatoes, 4 small onions, 4 green peppers, 2 teacups of
sugar, 2 quarts of cider vinegar, 2 ounces ground allspice, 2 ounces cloves, 2
ounces cinnamon, 12 teaspoonfuls salt. Chop tomatoes, onions and peppers
fine, add the rest mixed together and bottle cold. Measure tomatoes when
peeled. In case I die before my husband I leave everything to him."
-(signed) MAGGIE NOTHE.
John Marshall Gest, SomeJolly Testators, 8 TEMP. L.Q. 297, 301 (1934).
215 See Clowney, supra note 213, at 30 (describing the case of Cecil George Harris,
a Canadian farmer who inscribed on a fender, "In case I die in this mess, I leave all to
my wife" with a knife after being trapped under his tractor).
216 Id. at 55-56.
217 Bernard Rudden, Book Review, 44 MOD. L. REV. 610, 610 (1981).
218 See, e.g., THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDE TO WILLS & ESTATES 105-06,
288, 305-06 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing spendthrift trusts and arbitration clauses);
HENRY W. ABTS, III, THE LIVING TRUST 116-17, 152 (2003) (calling a no-contest clause
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on a subscription [web]site." 219 As documents created with these
products and services become more complicated, the likelihood that
they will accurately express a settlor's preferences decreases.
In In re Estate of Pozarny,220 for example, a New York state court
struggled to interpret a forty-page pre-printed form trust that failed to
name a fiduciary and suffered from "a staggering number of addi-
tional ambiguities, inconsistencies, apparent irrelevancies, and out-
right errors. '2 21 The judge provided a blistering condemnation of
commercialized trust forms:
The estate planning package containing the living trust and
pour-over Will is an example of a product being heavily promoted
throughout New York State .... One of the dangers of such a
system, which the instant case points up, is that it leads [individu-
als], who may have little if any experience in sophisticated estate
and tax planning, to consider themselves competent to "draft" com-
plex instruments and purvey them on a large scale. In the matter
before us, . . . such "drafting" appears no more than piecing
together various sections from the forms, often in a seemingly feck-
less, haphazard manner.
Indeed, this Will and trust agreement collectively represent the
most egregious example of maladroit "drafting" this court has
encountered. 222
Although Pozarny may be an extreme case, it illustrates the perils
of what Joel Dobris calls "the massification of trusts, or, the pedestri-
anization of trusts."223 As more lay people try their hands at a service
historically provided by licensed professionals, informational defects
will only become more common. Indeed, if a commercial trust can
neglect to name a fiduciary, then other, less obvious deviations from
the settlor's wishes are not just possible, but likely.
d. Articulating the Rule
The trust-specific procedural unconscionability prong should
seek out clauses that are probably not what an informed settlor would
have wanted. As with contract law, the test should be flexible. An
important threshold issue should be whether a lawyer represented the
a "necessary provision[] for a good living trust" and an arbitration clause "an added
protection").
219 Kathy M. Kristof, Legal Champion for the Middle Class, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2007,
at C3.
220 677 N.Y.S.2d 714 (Sur. Ct. 1998).
221 Id. at 716.
222 Id. at 717.
223 Dobris, supra note 7, at 563.
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settlor during the drafting process. Of course, there are lawyers of all
stripes, including those of lesser competence, and attorney represen-
tation is no panacea. Yet the law must draw a bright line somewhere
to avoid unnecessarily subjecting every trust to heightened scrutiny.
In addition, the doctrine of professional malpractice already provides
remedies for informational defects in lawyer-drafted trusts. 224 As con-
tract law generally refuses to let powerful enterprises invoke procedu-
ral unconscionability, 225 trust law could do the same for settlors who
received legal advice. If an institutional fiduciary referred the settlor
to the attorney, however, courts should look past the bare fact of rep-
resentation and examine the lawyer's ties to the trustee and actions on
behalf of the settlor. If the former are too strong and the latter defi-
cient, courts should be able to determine that the settlor did not
receive the benefit of independent counsel.
Another key inquiry should be the nature of the disputed terms.
Some aspects of a trust might be categorically immune from a finding
of procedural unconscionability. For instance, there is little risk that a
dispositive provision-which simply allocates property among benefi-
ciaries-will be nonsalient. Other terms, however, are less straightfor-
ward and will be less likely to attract settlors' attention. As noted,
clauses that govern the resolution of disputes are prime candidates for
nonsalience. Overall, courts should be willing to find procedural
unconscionability for clauses that are dense, legalistic, or otherwise
difficult for an unrepresented settlor to grasp. Courts might also con-
sider the physical appearance of the language 226 and the settlor's busi-
ness acumen. The precise formulation of these factors matters less
224 Many states allow beneficiaries to sue the drafting attorney for scrivener's error
if they can prove that the settlor "specifically intended for his attorneys' services to
benefit [them]." Johnson v. Sandier, Balkin, Hellman & Weinstein, P.C., 958 S.W.2d
42, 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); see also Bucquet v. Livingston, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514, 517-21
(Ct. App. 1976) (noting that because the settlor is often dead when the error is
detected, "[u]nless the beneficiaries can recover against the attorney, no one could
do so and the social policy of preventing future harm would be frustrated").
225 See, e.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. Moessner, 121 F.3d 895, 904 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997)
(noting the existence of an exception in the insurance context for "a large commer-
cial enterprise that has substantial economic strength, desirability as a customer, and
an understanding of insurance matters, or readily available assistance in understand-
ing and procuring insurance"); Avid Eng'g, Inc. v. Orlando Marketplace, Ltd., 809 So.
2d 1, 5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (refusing to find an arbitration clause procedurally
unconscionable when it "was negotiated at arms length by relatively sophisticated par-
ties with relatively equal bargaining power").
226 For example, in Pozarny, the court expressed concern over the fact that the
trust consisted of loose leaf pages in a three-ring binder, which might easily become
confused. See Pozarny, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 717. More often, however, this issue will turn
on whether a term is in small font or otherwise difficult to read.
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than the driving force behind them: exposing informational defects in
the trust-creation process.
2. Substantive Unconscionability
If a court has determined that a term is procedurally unconscion-
able, it should void the term if it is also substantively unconsciona-
ble-that is, grossly unfair. The principle here is that a clause that
significantly limits rights or remedies is probably a clause that the set-
tlor did not truly understand. Since trusts exist to benefit the benefi-
ciaries, 227 the fact that language works an unjustified hardship
suggests that the settlor did not grasp its ramifications. Also, if a set-
tlor is not fully aware of the effect of a clause, its value to her, if any,
must be exceedingly small. Yet terms that erode beneficiaries' rights
and remedies greatly diminish their utility. Arguably, if the settlor
were aware of this discrepancy, she would voluntarily remove the pro-
vision. But because the settlor presumably is dead and cannot do so,
substantive unconscionability fills the role.
In its purest form, substantive unconscionability would apply to a
term drafted by the trustee that enhances its power at the expense of
the settlor or the beneficiaries. In such a case, the trust-specific
unconscionability doctrine would be functionally identical to its con-
tract law counterpart. By invalidating the clause, it aligns the instru-
ment with what the settlor's intent would have been if not for
informational defects. Moreover, it penalizes the drafter for taking
advantage of the settlor. In these circumstances, trust law could
import the teachings of contract law wholesale. Judges in the trust
milieu could even examine contract precedent to define the bounda-
ries of gross unfairness. For instance, as in contract law, a clause
might be grossly unfair if it requires the settlor or beneficiary to sub-
mit claims against the trustee to arbitration, but permits the trustee to
sue in court. 22 8 Likewise, a term might be grossly unfair if it purports
227 See supra note 28.
228 See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 692 (Cal.
2000) (holding an arbitration clause that required the employee but not the
employer to submit claims to arbitration to be substantively unconscionable); Mot-
singer v. Lithia Rose-FT, Inc., 156 P.3d 156, 163 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) ("[S]ome courts
have concluded that, despite the existence of adequate consideration, a nonmutual
arbitration clause is presumptively unconscionable when the parties lack equal bargain-
ing power."); Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 173 (Wis. 2006)
("Many courts have reached a similar conclusion of unconscionability when one-sided
arbitration provisions require the weaker party to arbitrate."). But see Harris v. Green
Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 180 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting this argument on the
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to waive specific remedies on behalf of the settlor or beneficiaries, but
leaves the trustee's arsenal fully stocked. 229
The harder question is whether substantive unconscionability
should apply when the drafter is not also the trustee, or when the
term at issue favors one beneficiary over another. In either instance,
the drafter has not exploited the settlor's imperfect information for
personal gain. For example, suppose a mill trust limits the settlor's
ability to replace the trustee. Because the trust mill will never serve as
trustee, it has no stake in the enforceability of the language. Similarly,
if an institutional trustee inserts a far-ranging no-contest clause in an
instrument, the party who profits is not the trustee, but any benefici-
ary whose gift is vulnerable to judicial challenge. Unlike substantive
unconscionability in contract law, voiding a term in these situations
does not seem to punish drafter overreaching. Without this element
of advantage taking, it might seem strange to use the morally loaded
idiom "unconscionable" to describe the clause.
Nevertheless, a trust-specific unconscionability defense could still
serve a limited punitive and deterrent function. The defense would
authorize courts to declare that a trust mill or do-it-yourself purveyor
failed to memorialize the settlor's desires properly. Over time, this
publicly available data could affect these entities' reputations. There-
fore, albeit in an attenuated way, the doctrine could castigate drafters
for creating flawed terms.
More importantly, a broad definition of substantive unconsciona-
bility that applies even in the absence of drafter wrongdoing would
befit trust law. As noted, trust law gives courts greater freedom to
ignore an instrument's text than contract law does. Beneficiary-pro-
voked modification or termination, the rule against perpetuities, elec-
tive share statutes, and the muscular public policy defense override
the settlor's intent when necessary to minimize social costs or protect
third parties. In fact, unlike these rules, which are controversial, in
part, because they are interventionist, the unconscionability defense is
intent-serving. It harmonizes a trust's terms with what an informed
grounds that promises need not be reciprocal so long as they are supported by
consideration).
229 See Zuver v. Airtouch Commc'ns, Inc., 103 P.3d 753, 767 (Wash. 2004) (en
banc) (ruling that a clause that relinquished the employee's-but not the
employer's-right to punitive damages was substantively unconscionable because it
"allow[ed] the employer alone access to a significant legal recourse"); David S.
Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability, and
Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REx. 49, 50 (2003) ("Courts have not been taken in:
they have uniformly refused to enforce such remedy-stripping clauses to deprive the
non-drafting party of substantive rights and remedies.").
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settlor would have chosen. It thus addresses perhaps the most funda-
mental question in trust law: what is the settlor's true intent. This
important and independent basis for the doctrine has nothing to do
with deterring drafter malfeasance.
Finally, terms that deviate from a party's informed ex ante prefer-
ences arguably work more harm in trust law than they do in contract
law. For one, trusts tend to be higher value transactions than con-
sumer form contracts. As a result, harsh terms that slip in unnoticed
can impose greater welfare loss. In addition, trusts, unlike contracts,
serve an important expressive function.2 30 In the exculpatory clause
example above, where the settlor inadvertently freed the trustee from
a duty of reasonable care, the harm that flows to the beneficiaries is
not strictly financial. 23 1 Indeed, the exculpatory clause could seem to
send a powerful signal-one infused with all the solemnity of the tes-
tamentary act-that the settlor preferred the trustee to the benefi-
ciaries or viewed the beneficiaries as contentious. Likewise, a no-
contest clause that favors one beneficiary over another can be con-
strued as a powerful statement about love and trust. The trust-specific
unconscionability doctrine would eliminate these messages when the
settlor did not truly intend to convey them.
C. Counterarguments
To be sure, the concept of an unconscionable testamentary
instrument would be a departure, and faces powerful counterargu-
ments. First, the idea of a procedurally unconscionable trust might
seem incompatible with the concept that individuals who sign docu-
ments have a duty to read them.232 Although the duty to read has
roots in contract law, 233 one state supreme court recently extended it
to a trust instrument.234 One could even argue that a duty to read
230 See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation, and Stories, 42 DutE LJ. 630,
648-49 (1992) ("To the extent that a will is an expression of autonomy and self-deter-
mination, what it can be expected to communicate is the testator's unique and per-
sonal ideas .... (footnote omitted)).
231 See supra Part II.B.
232 See, e.g., Biesecker v. Biesecker, 302 S.E.2d 826, 828-29 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983)
(explaining that a "'person signing a written instrument is under a duty to read it'"
(quoting 6 STRONG'S N.C. INDEx 3D, Statute of Frauds § 5 (1977))).
233 See generally John D. Calamari, Duty to Read-A Changing Concept, 43 FoRD-AM
L. REv. 341 (1974) (describing how the duty to read, once a firmly entrenched princi-
ple of contract law, has given way to a "reasonableness" test that often leads to incon-
sistent results).
234 See In re Estate of Smid, 756 N.W.2d 1, 7 (S.D. 2008) (upholding a spouse's
waiver of her elective share rights in the decendent's trust because "'one who accepts
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makes more sense when applied to trusts than standard form con-
tracts. It may be rational for a person to ignore, say, a software
license, but the same cannot be said of an instrument that allocates
their property after death.
But this contention proves too much. The duty to read ensures
that parties cannot escape their responsibilities by remaining willfully
ignorant of them: if parties were bound only to terms they actually
read, they would ignore their obligations and inundate courts with ex
post claims of unawareness. 235 But if settlors are naturally inclined to
try to understand trusts, then the duty to read is superfluous. It is an
artificial construct encouraging conduct that needs no encourage-
ment. Because the duty to read adds virtually nothing in the trust
context, elevating it above the core values the unconscionability doc-
trine could serve would be misguided.
More importantly, even if trust law does embrace the duty to
read, it is not inconsistent with the unconscionability defense.
Indeed, the two coexist in contract law. This illustrates a crucial point
about the unconscionability rule-it targets an evil that would exist
even if consumers read instruments thoroughly. Recall that consum-
ers can only exert market pressure on sellers to internalize their pref-
erences for salient terms: those that consumers actually factor into
their purchasing choices. As Russell Korobkin explains, the mere fact
that a buyer reads a term does not necessarily make it salient:
A form term calling for arbitration of disputes in an inconvenient
state, for example, is likely to be non-salient to the vast majority of
buyers unless the type of contract in question commonly results in
disputes. This fact is not necessarily changed if the seller takes steps
to inform the buyer about this term-for example, by orally inform-
ing the buyer or requiring him to write his initials next to the term
on the contract to signal his actual knowledge and assent. "Notice"
is a prerequisite of salience, but notice is not a sufficient condition
of salience. 236
Thus, even terms that many settlors read can deviate from what
their informed preferences would have been.
a contract is conclusively presumed to know its contents and to assent to them'"
(quoting Holzer v. Dakota Speedway, Inc., 610 N.W.2d 787, 795 (S.D. 2000))).
235 See, e.g., Alliance Trust Co. v. Armstrong, 186 So. 633, 635 (Miss. 1939) ("'To
permit a party, when sued on a written contract, to admit that he signed it but to deny
that it expresses the agreement he made or to allow him to admit that he signed it but
did not read it or know its stipulations would absolutely destroy the value of all con-
tracts.'" (quoting 12 AM. JUR. Contracts § 137 (1938))).
236 Korobkin, supra note 60, at 1234.
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A second rejoinder to a procedural unconscionability doctrine in
trust law is that settlors, unlike contracting parties, often retain the
power to amend their instruments. Unless part or all of the trust has
become irrevocable, 23 7 settlors can change terms with which they
become dissatisfied. This additional line of defense arguably tempers
the need for a rule that targets informational flaws during the drafting
process.
Nevertheless, I find this argument unpersuasive. First, the notion
that settlors will discover that terms deviate from their ex ante wishes
is implausible. Many terms, especially those that govern dispute reso-
lution or the relationship between the trustee and the beneficiaries,
lie dormant until the settlor dies. It is hard to imagine what might
cause a settlor to reconsider them during her life. Indeed, even if the
settlor rereads the trust, if a term was not salient when she executed
the instrument, then it will most likely remain nonsalient. Moreover,
because suspect terms often regulate administrative minutiae or
events that are unlikely to occur, few will seem bothersome enough to
warrant the trouble of revising the instrument. Finally, in the unlikely
event that a settlor unearths disconcerting language, transaction costs
may discourage her from amending it. Settlors may be unwilling to
try to revise the instrument themselves, especially if the error
stemmed from eschewing legal counsel in the first place. Thus, a set-
tlor's ability to amend the trust is unlikely to eliminate informational
defects in the drafting process.
III. APPLYING THE DOCTRINE
Finally, to make the discussion as concrete and helpful as possi-
ble, this Part considers three specific terms that have long vexed
courts and academics: those that expand the trustee's powers, those
that condition bequests on a beneficiary not contesting the trust, and
those that require arbitration. It showcases how a trust-specific uncon-
scionability doctrine could improve outcomes in cases.
A. Exculpatory Clauses and Other Pro-trustee Provisions
Although the unconscionability doctrine would be a novel addi-
tion to trust law, courts have effectively adopted the defense in one
important context. Indeed, the rules that govern the validity of an
exculpatory provision inserted by the trustee have slowly gravitated
237 Settlors may make trusts irrevocable at their inception for tax reasons. In addi-
tion, the traditional joint husband-wife estate plan typically makes the "bypass" trust
irrevocable when the first spouse dies. See DENIS CLIFFORD, PLAN YOUR ESTATE 292,
297-99 (9th ed. 2008).
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toward an unconscionability-like standard. At the same time, how-
ever, trust law inexplicably does not subject other terms that aggran-
dize the trustee's power to heightened scrutiny.
Exculpatory clauses became common in the early twentieth cen-
tury, as trust companies emerged and the nature of the trust shifted
from a mechanism for the conveyance of land to one for holding and
investing financial assets. 238 Corporate trustees began to draft instru-
ments or refer the settlor to a law firm that would do so, and trusts
began to feature terms that exonerated the trustee from liability for
poor decisions. At first, courts were unsure how to treat an exculpa-
tory term in instruments that the trustee or its associates had
drafted. 23 9 The Restatement of Trusts set forth six factors for courts to
gauge the validity of such a provision:
(1) whether the trustee prior to the creation of the trust had been
in a fiduciary relationship to the settlor, as where the trustee had
been guardian of the settlor; (2) whether the trust instrument was
drawn by the trustee or by a person acting wholly or partially on his
behalf; (3) whether the settlor has taken independent advice as to
the provisions of the trust instrument; (4) whether the settlor is a
person of experience and judgment or is a person who is unfamiliar
with business affairs or is not a person of much judgment or under-
standing; (5) whether the insertion of the provision was due to
undue influence or other improper conduct on the part of the trus-
tee; (6) the extent and reasonableness of the provision. 24 0
This rubric, just like the unconscionability doctrine, bifurcates
into procedural and substantive elements. Indeed, the third and
fourth factors, which consider whether the settlor received counsel or
is sophisticated, also inform the test for whether a contract is proce-
238 See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 8, at 638 ("The modern trust typically holds a
portfolio of these complex financial assets, which are contract rights against the issu-
ers. This portfolio requires active and specialized management, in contrast to the
conveyancing trust that merely held ancestral land.").
239 In Fleener v. Omaha National Co., 267 N.W. 462 (Neb. 1936), for example, the
Nebraska Supreme Court considered an exculpatory clause in a deed of trust. The
plaintiffs argued that the clause should be invalid because the trustee, a bank, had
drafted the instrument. The court disagreed, reasoning the issue would be relevant
only if the trust were ambiguous. See id. at 464. Conversely, in Jothann v. Irving Trust
Co., 270 N.Y.S. 721 (Gen. Term 1934), a New York appellate court cast a skeptical eye
on such clauses. The plaintiff, "an unmarried woman and a stranger in New York
City, with little business experience," was referred to a lawyer by a trust company. Id.
at 722. The resulting instrument contained an exculpatory clause. Noting that the
plaintiff did not enjoy independent representation and that the trust company's
explanation of the provision "was superficial and entirely inadequate," the court
declined to enforce it. Id. at 724-26.
240 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 cmt. d (1959).
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durally unconscionable. The sixth factor, which weighs the term's
"reasonableness," is a watered-down version of substantive unconscio-
nability's benchmark of "gross unfairness."
Over time, these unconscionability-type factors became the ful-
crum of the Restatement test. Courts focused largely on whether
informational defects may have prevented the settlor from appreciat-
ing the exculpatory term's effect. For example, in Rutanen v. Bal-
lard,24 1 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court voided such a
clause, reasoning that "the settlor received no independent advice,...
was seventy years old, had had a stroke and was 'in questionable
health.' "242 Conversely, in Americans for the Arts v. Ruth Lilly Charitable
Remainder Annuity Trust,2 4 3 an Indiana appellate court rejected the
claim that an exculpatory clause was invalid because the trustee had
"buried" it in the instrument:
No party was naive, unrepresented, or taken advantage of in this
situation. Moreover, paragraph 10(b) is neither buried nor mis-
leadingly labeled. Indeed, it takes up one-half of one page in a ten-
page document. The language is signaled with a double-spaced
lead-in indicating that the provisions to follow encompass all of the
powers and rights of the trustee in administering the document.
244
This emphasis on the identity of the parties and the physical
appearance of the language is the functional equivalent of determin-
ing whether the instrument is procedurally unconscionable.
The Uniform Trust Code cements the similarity between the
rules that govern trustee-drafted exculpatory clauses and the uncon-
scionability doctrine. Section 1008(b) whittles down the relevant fac-
tors for assessing the validity of such terms to (1) the procedural issue
of whether the "existence and contents" of the exculpatory provision
"were adequately communicated to the settlor" and (2) the substan-
tive issue of whether "the exculpatory term is fair under the circum-
stances. '2 45 Moreover, as John Langbein has noted, section 1008(b)'s
purpose is to "prevent[] enforcement of a clause that the settlor prob-
ably did not intend or understand. '246 That is precisely the aim of the
unconscionability doctrine. 247
241 678 N.E.2d 133 (Mass. 1997).
242 Id. at 141.
243 855 N.E.2d 592 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
244 Id. at 598.
245 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008(b) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 654 (2006).
246 Langbein, supra note 6, at 1125.
247 Section 1008(b) reflects the modern trend of placing the burden on the fiduci-
ary to prove disclosure and reasonableness. Compare New England Trust Co. v. Paine,
59 N.E.2d 263, 270 (Mass. 1945) (upholding a clause due to the absence of evidence
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Despite the existence of section 1008(b), the unconscionability
defense can still pay dividends in the realm of exculpatory clauses.
First, it can explain a significant ambiguity in section 1008(b) and a
longstanding puzzle in trust doctrine. Section 1008(b) carves out a
categorical exception for settlors who were represented by "indepen-
dent counsel":
The requirements of subsection (b) are satisfied if the settlor
was represented by independent counsel. If the settlor was repre-
sented by independent counsel, the settlor's attorney is considered
the drafter of the instrument even if the attorney used the trustee's
form. Because the settlor's attorney is an agent of the settlor, disclo-
sure of an exculpatory term to the settlor's attorney is disclosure to
the settlor. 248
Of course, the modifier "independent" could set the minimal
requirement that the lawyer not also be on the trustee's payroll. Yet it
could also mandate some degree of separation between the lawyer
and the trustee-proof that the trustee neither recommended the
lawyer nor provided a regular stream of rainmaking. By punting on
whether to scrutinize an exculpatory clause when the settlor's lawyer
has ties to a corporate fiduciary, section 1008(b) continues the legacy
of the first Restatement of Trusts, which expressly demurred on the
issue249 and the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, which ignored it.250
However, if the rule's purpose, as Langbein declares, is to rectify
informational asymmetries, 25' then it is simply a codification of the
that the trustee improperly inserted it), and Marsman v. Nasca, 573 N.E.2d 1025, 1033
(Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (upholding a clause because "there was no evidence that the
insertion of the clause was an abuse of [the trustee's] fiduciary relationship"), with
Rutanen v. Ballard, 678 N.E.2d 133, 141 (Mass. 1997) ("The practice of 'casually dis-
miss[ing] as mere boilerplate an exculpatory provision . . . is unacceptable."' (quot-
ing AuGUSTUS PEABODY LORING, A TRUSTEE'S HANDBOOK § 7.2.6 (7th ed. 1994))), In re
Estate of Kramer, No. 92-2347, 2003 WL 22889500, at *5 (Pa. Ct. Com. PI., May 15,
2003) ("[Tjhe scrivener/fiduciary has the burden of establishing that the client real-
ized the implications of such a clause."), and Petty v. Privette, 818 S.W.2d 743, 748
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (placing the burden on the trustee). In this way, section
1008(b) is more protective of settlor intent than the unconscionability defense, which
places the burden on the party seeking invalidation of the clause.
248 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008(b) cmt. (amended 2005).
249 See RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 222 cmt. d (1935) ("Caveat The authorities do
not justify any statement on the question to what extent a provision relieving the
trustee of liability is ineffective in the case of a corporate trustee where the trust
instrument is drawn by an attorney regularly retained by the trustee or an attorney
recommended by the trustee.").
250 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 cmt. d (1959) (eliminating any
language about attorneys with connections to trustees).
251 Langbein, supra note 6, at 1125-26.
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unconscionability principle. Construed against that backdrop, section
1008(b) should probe the link between a settdor's lawyer and a corpo-
rate trustee for "independence." As I have argued above, a settlor will
probably fail to grasp the import of an exculpatory clause unless her
lawyer calls her attention to it and its possible effects. A lawyer who is
beholden to an institutional trustee for a steady revenue stream will
not necessarily do so. Thus, the values behind the unconscionability
doctrine militate against making settlor representation dispositive in
all cases.
However, the unconscionability doctrine could be most useful
outside of the narrow contours of section 1008(b). Even when excul-
patory provisions are not inserted by a corporate trustee, they present,
in the words of one court, a "menace not only to the rights of a surviv-
ing spouse but of the children and other dependents of the [settlor]
and of all persons interested in estates." 252 Yet trust law relies on the
orthodox defenses of mistake and public policy to combat informa-
tional defects in these terms. These rules lack the flexibility of the
unconscionability doctrine's hybrid procedural/substantive approach
and are relics of a time when informational flaws were uncommon in
instruments. Because the unconscionability doctrine allows courts to
void exculpatory terms that depart from an informed settlor's ex ante
intent, it stands for the common sense proposition that drastic provi-
sions should be unenforceable if there is reason to believe that the
settlor did not understand their drastic effects.
Similarly, unconscionability could fill a gaping void outside the
context of exculpatory clauses. There are many other ways for a trus-
tee to aggrandize its power at the expense of the settlor or the benefi-
ciaries. In particular, terms that allow the trustee to use trust funds to
defend itself in litigation or entrench itself against being replaced can
have serious ramifications. Notably, though, section 1008(b) does not
apply to these clauses-even when they are drafted by the trustee. It is
unclear why trust law subjects trustee-inserted exculpatory terms to
heightened scrutiny but not other trustee-inserted, pro-trustee terms.
Indeed, applying the unconscionability doctrine to these clauses will
have the double-barreled benefit of contract law unconscionability-
not only will it align the trust with the settlor's true intent, but it will
penalize drafter overreaching. Thus, the unconscionability defense
could better equip this area of trust law to deal with the realities of
contemporary trust practice.
252 In re Estate of Stralem, 695 N.Y.S.2d 274, 278 (Sur. Ct. 1999).
20091 1731
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
B. No-Contest Clauses
The unconscionability rule could also prove helpful in the misty
arena of the no-contest clause. No-contest clauses, also known as in
terrorem clauses, impose forfeitures on beneficiaries who seek specific
forms of legal redress. 253 Most often, no-contest clauses require bene-
ficiaries not to dispute the validity of an instrument. Nevertheless,
even the law governing this most basic species of no-contest clause is a
patchwork of inconsistent approaches and decisions. Jurisdictions
alternatively enforce no-contest clauses in most circumstances, 254
refuse to enforce them at all,255 or enforce them only when a benefici-
ary lacks "probable cause" for the lawsuit. 256 The primary difficulty
with formulating an appropriate rule is that no-contest clauses pit crit-
ical values against each other. On the one hand, settlors have the
right to condition gifts and enjoy peace of mind that their final wishes
will be carried out. On the other hand, individuals should be able to
253 See, e.g., Gerry W. Beyer et al., The Fine Art of Intimidating Disgruntled Beneficiaries
With In Terrorem Clauses, 51 SMU L. REV. 225, 227 (1998) ("Under a typical in ter-
rorem provision, the beneficiary is presented with a choice of either (1) accepting the
gift under the will or trust, or (2) contesting the instrument with the hope of upset-
ting the testator's or settlor's intended disposition .... "). No-contest clauses date
back to the seventeenth century. See, e.g., Anonymous, 86 Eng. Rep. 910 (1674)
(enforcing clause that provided, "[i]f A. molest B. by suit or otherwise, he shall lose
what is devised to him, and it shall go to B"). Yet they have long sparked "'a confu-
sion ofjudicial thought altogether out of proportion to the apparent simplicity of the
issues involved."' Martin D. Begleiter, Anti-Contest Clauses: When You Care Enough to
Send the Final Threat, 26 ARIz. ST. L.J. 629, 629 (1994) (quoting Olin L. Browder, Jr.,
Testamentary Conditions Against Contest Re-Examined, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 320, 320
(1949)).
254 See Tunstall v. Wells, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 479 (Ct. App. 2006) ("California
traditionally has been among the states that hold no contest clauses valid regardless of
whether there is probable cause or good faith to challenge them."); Ackerman v.
Genevieve Ackerman Family Trust, 908 A.2d 1200, 1202 (D.C. 2006) ("[T]here is no
exception to enforcement of a 'no contest' clause even when litigation is brought in
good faith and with probable cause.").
255 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.517 (West 2008) ("A provision in a will purporting to
penalize any interested person for contesting the will or instituting other proceedings
relating to the estate is unenforceable."); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-6-2 (West 2008)
("[S]uch provision or provisions shall be void and of no force or effect.").
256 See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2517 (2005); In re Estate of Peppler, 971 P.2d
694, 697 (Colo. App. 1998); Hannam v. Brown, 956 P.2d 794, 798 (Nev. 1998)
("[P]ublic policy favors recognition of the implied exception to no-contest clauses for
good faith challenges based on probable cause."); UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-905 (1983);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.1 (1983); cf. CAL. PROB.
CODE § 21306 (West 2008) (recognizing a limited probable cause exception for
claims of forgery, revocation, or transfer to a disqualified person).
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access courts freely, and society has a stake in exposing and prevent-
ing illegal conduct.
An additional complexity is that the scope of prohibited conduct
under a no-contest clause is often unclear. For example, a common
no-contest clause forbids not just frontal challenges to the trust's valid-
ity under the doctrines of incapacity and undue influence, but also
attempts to "'otherwise . . .set aside this [t]rust or any of its provi-
sions'." 257 Because the broad phrase "'set aside . . . provisions"'
sweeps within its ambit any action that thwarts the settlor's intent,
courts have applied the clause to a surviving spouse's effort to enforce
her community property rights under ERISA,258 a petition to remove
a fiduciary,259 a breach of contract claim, 260 and a frivolous objection
to an accounting.261
Because no-contest clauses can thus chill a range of potential liti-
gation, courts must differentiate between permissible terms and those
that go too far. To draw this boundary, courts employ the violation of
public policy defense. 262 But because forceful arguments lurk on
both sides of the policy ledger, it cannot provide a clear blueprint for
borderline cases. Consider two sentences from a recent California
Supreme Court opinion:
No contest clauses are valid in California and are favored by the
public policies of discouraging litigation and giving effect to the
purposes expressed by the testator. Because a no contest clause
results in a forfeiture, however, a court is required to strictly con-
strue it and may not extend it beyond what was plainly the testator's
intent.26 3
For courts, settlors, and estate planners, being instructed that no-
contest terms are both "favored by ... public polic [y]" and yet must
be "strictly construe[d]" is not helpful. Indeed, it results in ad hoc
balancing that makes enforceability issues difficult to predict.
257 Burch v. George, 866 P.2d 92, 100 (Cal. 1994) (en banc) (emphasis removed)
(quoting a trust provision).
258 See id.
259 See In re Estate of Kubick, 513 P.2d 76, 79-80 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973).
260 See Zwirn v. Schweizer, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 527, 531-32 (Ct. App. 2005).
261 See Estate of Ferber, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 774, 779-81 (Ct. App. 1998) (dictum).
262 See, e.g., Estate of Wojtalewicz v. Woitel, 418 N.E.2d 418, 420-21 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981) (striking down a clause that attempted to prevent beneficiaries from objecting
to accounting); In re Andrus' Will, 281 N.Y.S. 831, 851-52 (Sur. Ct. 1935) (invalidat-
ing a clause that sought blanket approval of a fiduciary's conduct).
263 Burch v. George, 866 P.2d 92, 96 (Cal. 1994) (citations omitted).
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A second drawback is that the public policy rule is entirely sub-
stantive. For instance, in Estate of Ferber,264 the testator had been
embroiled in two decades of bitter litigation over his father's estate.
When the time came for him to make his own will, he instructed his
lawyer to include "the strongest possible no contest clause."265 The
resulting provision stripped gifts from beneficiaries who unsuccess-
fully tried to remove a fiduciary. A California appellate court bal-
anced the "chilling effect on beneficiaries" with the powerful "public
policy in favor of the validity of no contest clauses," and determined
that the provision was only valid if applied to frivolous claims.266 Tell-
ingly, however, the testator's understandable aversion to litigation
played no role in the analysis.
Making the unconscionability doctrine the primary means of reg-
ulating no-contest clauses would interject procedural considerations
into the analysis. To be sure, the public policy defense could still
effect a bright-line proscription against no-contest terms that purport
to apply to certain causes of action. For example, the rule could nul-
lify no-contest clauses that apply to breach of trust allegations and
thus require unwavering allegiance to the trustee's decisions. 267 For
marginal issues, though, expanding the terrain of judicial inquiry to
include a procedural component would sharpen the contours of what
is permissible. Courts might be more willing to uphold no-contest
clauses such as the one in Ferber in light of the evidence that it
reflected the testator's strongly felt desires. Unlike the current law,
which turns decisions about a term's enforceability into sweeping pro-
nouncements, the unconscionability defense is case-specific. The
clause in Ferber might be enforceable on that case's unique facts, but
invalid if contained in a boilerplate mill trust.
In addition, as in other contexts, the unconscionability doctrine
could identify and void no-contest terms that are inefficient and
autonomy-thwarting. Current doctrine is poorly calibrated to serve
these ends. For example, a no-contest clause in a mill trust would
likely pass muster under the public policy doctrine, but likely would
not reflect the settlor's informed ex ante preferences. In fact, because
the settlor would likely be unaware of the clause, it would discourage
meritorious litigation but add none of the values associated with per-
mitting the exercise of testamentary freedom in return. The uncon-
scionability doctrine would give courts a means to police these terms.
264 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 774, 775 (Ct. App. 1998) (en banc).
265 Id. at 775.
266 Id. at 779-81.
267 See supra note 262.
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C. Arbitration Clauses
Finally, the unconscionability defense could be useful as courts
struggle with how to treat arbitration clauses in trusts. In contract law,
issues relating to the enforceability of arbitration clauses-especially
those imposed by firms on consumers-are controversial. 268 The dif-
ficulty stems from the U.S. Supreme Court's expansive view of the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).269 The FAA requires courts to enforce
agreements to arbitrate, subject only to common law contract
defenses:
[A] contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle
by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract
or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract. 270
The Court has noted that the FAA expresses a "'liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements"' 27 1 and preempts contrary
state law.27 2 This deference toward arbitration clauses has given par-
ties license to customize the rules that will govern their dispute in arbi-
tration. 273 For example, parties have drafted-and courts have upheld
-arbitration provisions that waive the right to bring a class action,2 74
268 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It just?, 57 STAN. L.
REv. 1631, 1632 n.1 (2005) (describing the debate).
269 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
270 Id. § 2.
271 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991) (quoting
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
272 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) ("We see nothing in the
Act indicating that the broad principle of enforceability is subject to any additional
limitations under state law.").
273 See Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup.
CT. REv. 331, 332-33 ("[T]he Court appears to be transforming a dispute-resolving
process traditionally regarded in this country as nonlegal into a process more nearly
resembling that of a court of law.").
274 See Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 174 (5th
Cir. 2004) (upholding an arbitration agreement provision barring class arbitration);
Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 693 N.W.2d 918, 926 (N.D. 2005) (same); Spann v.
Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 224 S.W.3d 698, 714 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006)
(same). The class action waiver has generated a firestorm of criticism. See, e.g.,
Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming Near-Total Demise of the Modern
Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REv. 373, 429 (2005) ("The question on the table here-
whether to enforce collective action waivers-totally and inevitably collapses into the
question of whether class actions are a good thing or a bad thing."); Jean R. Ster-
nlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Sur-
vive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (2000) (arguing that the controversy will soon become
moot as parties will realize that class actions are best handled through litigation).
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reduce the length of the statute of limitations, 275 and proscribe the
recovery of attorney's fees. 276
Yet at the same time, arbitration is superior to litigation in many
ways. It is faster, 277 cheaper, 278 and confidential.279 These virtues may
be particularly appealing to settlors, who have strong interests in
streamlining estate-depleting litigation and preventing the dissemina-
tion of private information.280
However, the only cases to address the issue have held that arbi-
tration clauses in trusts are unenforceable. In Schoneberger v. Oelze,281
the Arizona court of appeals concluded that a trust did not fall within
a state statute requiring the enforcement of an arbitration provision
in a "written contract."282  The court reasoned that while
"[a] rbitration rests on an exchange of promises [,] ... [a] trust merely
requires a trustor to transfer a beneficial interest in property to a trus-
tee who, under the trust instrument, relevant statutes and common
275 See In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 282-83 (4th Cir. 2007)
(upholding one-year statute of limitations in antitrust claims).
276 See Faber v. Menard, Inc., 367 F.3d 1048, 1055 (8th Cir. 2004) (enforcing a
waiver of the right to recover attorney's fees under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act).
277 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985) (heralding "the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration").
278 See PaineWebber Inc. v. Farnam, 843 F.2d 1050, 1052 (7th Cir. 1988) (calling
arbitration an "inexpensive alternative to litigation").
279 See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000) ("People
who want secrecy should opt for arbitration. When they call on the courts, they must
accept the openness that goes with subsidized dispute resolution by public (and pub-
licly accountable) officials.").
280 See Michael P. Bruyere & Meghan D. Marino, Mandatory Arbitration Provisions: A
Powerful Tool to Prevent Contentious and Costly Trust Litigation, but Are They Enforceable?,
42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 351, 352 (2007) ("[T]he grantor can shelter benefi-
ciaries from the stress of litigation while protecting private and potentially embarrass-
ing information from public disclosure; trustees can protect trust assets from
depletion by litigation costs while limiting personal liability; and beneficiaries, partic-
ularly those with limited funds available for litigation, can ensure quick and lower cost
resolutions."); Ronald R. Volkmer, Arbitration Clauses in Trust Agreements, EsT. PLAN.,
Jan. 2005, at 55, 55. ("Given the perils (and costs) of litigation, some drafters of trusts
may be inclined to include in the trust instrument a provision requiring arbitration of
any future disputes."); see also E. Gary Spitko, Gone but Not Conforming: Protecting the
Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration,
49 CASE W. Rs. L. REV. 275, 314 (1999) (arguing that arbitration may provide a ref-
uge for cultural minorities, whose testamentary wishes are thwarted by courts and
juries imposing hegemonic norms).
281 96 P.3d 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
282 Id. at 1080 (quoting ARiz. REv,. STAT. § 12-1501 (2003)).
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law, holds that interest for the beneficiary." 2 3  Similarly, in In re
Calomiris,28 4 an appellate court in the District of Columbia relied heav-
ily on Schoneberger and reached the same result under its local arbitra-
tion statute. 285
These cases make sense as matters of statutory interpretation:
neither legislature likely meant the word "contract" to include trusts.
Yet one problem with Schoneberger and Calomiris is that neither consid-
ered whether settlors have the inherent ability to compel arbitration
even without express statutory authority. After all, through no-contest
clauses, settlors can force beneficiaries to choose between bringing a
claim and accepting a bequest. As a result, settlors would also seem to
enjoy the lesser power to force beneficiaries to choose between sub-
mitting claims to arbitration and accepting a bequest. 2 6 In any event,
some jurisdictions are considering legislation that would place arbitra-
tion clauses in trusts on equal footing with arbitration clauses in
contracts. 28
7
If courts do indeed begin to enforce arbitration clauses in trusts,
they will need a means to protect against overreaching and remedy
stripping. As noted, the FAA and allied state statutes make arbitration
clauses enforceable unless a common law contract defense applies. 288
Thus, in contract law, the unconscionability defense has become the
main check against remedy-stripping arbitration clauses. 2 9 But since
trust law does not acknowledge the rule, allowing settlors to mandate
arbitration would give them a power against which there is no effec-
283 Id. at 1083.
284 894 A.2d 408 (D.C. 2006).
285 See id. at 409-10.
286 Such a clause might expressly put beneficiaries to an election between arbitrat-
ing disputes or taking nothing. Apparently, the clauses in Schoneberger and Calomiris
did not do so and instead merely purported to require arbitration. See Schoneberger, 96
P.3d at 1080; Calomiris, 894 A.2d at 408-09.
287 See Bruyere & Marino, supra note 280, at 364.
288 See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
289 For a sampling of state supreme courts recently holding arbitration clauses
unconscionable, see Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1116-17 (Cal.
2005); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 264-66 (Ill. 2006); Muhammad
v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88, 99 (NJ. 2006); and Scott v. Cingular
Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1003 (Wash. 2007) (en banc). For articles analyzing this
trend, see Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption,
Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DisP. RESOL. 469; Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionabil-
ity Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
757 (2004).
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tive safeguard. 290 Through arbitration clauses, they could significantly
rewrite the rules of trust litigation.
A trust law unconscionability doctrine would thus have two bene-
fits. First, its very existence could make courts more sanguine about
the concept of arbitration clauses in trusts. Exactly as in contract law,
the unconscionability rule could strike down overbearing arbitration
clauses. With this protection in place, courts might be more willing to
allow settlors to reap the many rewards of mandating arbitration. Sec-
ond, as always, the unconscionability doctrine would provide courts
with a means to make sure the clause accurately reflects the settlor's
informed preferences.
CONCLUSION
The time has come for trust law to adopt the unconscionability
doctrine. In contract law, the unconscionability doctrine ensures that
a clause does not sharply differ from a party's desires because of infor-
mational defects. Because enforcing such a term will be inefficient
and frustrate the party's autonomy, this purpose is vital to the health
and coherence of the body of law.
The unconscionability doctrine could serve the same purpose in
trust law. Although attorney representation and settlors' ability to
amend their instruments once made the rule unnecessary, fundamen-
tal changes in the process by which trusts are created and the nature
of their terms have made informational defects more common. By
identifying and striking clauses to which an informed settlor would
not have agreed, the unconscionability doctrine would protect trust
law's animating values.
290 Although courts could apply the public policy defense, it would suffer from
many of the same shortcomings as it does in the no contest clause context. See supra
notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
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